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## Article Title

### **Anatomy of Administrative Immigration Oversight Blind Spots: A Socio-Legal Study on the Paralysis of Early Warning Systems in Makassar**

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## **ABSTRACT**

*This in-depth research investigates the anatomy of blind spots within post-admission administrative oversight mechanisms for foreign nationals at the Makassar Immigration Checkpoint and elucidates the causal determinants that trigger the paralysis of early warning systems. The urgency of this study stems from the high rate of overstays, which reflects structural dysfunction in immigration governance within the primary transit territory of Eastern Indonesia. Employing an empirical legal research method with a socio-legal approach, primary data are triangulated through in-depth interviews, field observations, and statistical analysis of violations. The research results uncover a critical discrepancy between digital data registration at the port of entry and continuous field surveillance, resulting in the state losing control over the dynamic nomadic movements of foreign legal subjects. Juridically, this systemic paralysis constitutes a violation of the Principle of Carefulness, triggered by a chronic human resource deficit in the intelligence unit and the nullity of regulatorily mandated cross-sectoral information technology interoperability. Consequently, law enforcement tends to be constrained by reactive patterns and dependent on repressive deportation measures during the repressive phase. This study concludes that a paradigm reorientation towards risk-based surveillance, the transformation of apparatuses into administrative data analysts, and the reinforcement of the legal framework mandating real-time inter-agency data integration are necessary. These policy implications constitute absolute prerequisites for restoring legal authority and guaranteeing state sovereignty through proactive prevention mechanisms in the preventive phase.*

*Keywords:* Early Warning Systems; Foreign Nationals; Immigration Administration; Oversight Blind Spots; Stay Conditions.

## **INTRODUCTION**

The cross-border mobility of foreign nationals in the globalization era underscores the importance of immigration administration as a vital instrument to prevent threats to state sovereignty without impeding economic growth (Mayang et al., 2021; Satriawan et al., 2025; Putri & Dzirusyidi, 2026). The state possesses an absolute obligation to ensure that every admitted foreign national provides tangible benefits to the national interest. Immigration operates as a territorial filtration authority and the primary stage of internal security protection. Consequently, the regulation and oversight of foreign traffic constitute a legal mandate that must be executed strictly and precisely. The absence of effective oversight instruments can create opportunities for transnational crime and various forms of domestic legal violations.

The characteristics of immigration vulnerabilities within the Indonesian territory exhibit highly distinct typologies between the western and eastern regions. Immigration Checkpoints at major airports in Java or Bali generally confront criminal threats, including the use of forged documents and human smuggling. Conversely, eastern Indonesia faces specific challenges in overseeing foreign workers in the mining sector and in international maritime activities. These activities frequently involve foreign legal subjects with highly dynamic mobility profiles and nomadic movements. This difference in vulnerability dimensions necessitates the formulation of more specific, adaptive, and continuous oversight strategies for safeguarding state sovereignty in the eastern region.

As the concentration area and primary gateway for human traffic in the eastern region, Makassar City holds a crucial role as the main transit territory for foreign nationals (Sapiddin et al., 2021). The presence of large-scale investment projects in the surrounding areas, coupled with the transit flow of foreign nationals from the Pacific and Middle East regions, results in a high mobility rate within the city. These specific demographic and geographic conditions place the immigration apparatuses in Makassar in an operational position vulnerable to potential overstays. Therefore, the complex workload in this territory absolutely demands accurate administrative oversight capabilities as a preliminary control instrument.

The preliminary control instrument is operationalized through administrative oversight, encompassing document examination, system data entry, and enforcement of foreign presence reporting obligations. Conceptually, this oversight stage serves as a fundamental early warning system that detects potential immigration violations before they occur. Under the selective policy doctrine, this mechanism cannot be reduced to mere form-filling at the port of entry. Administrative order provides the primary legal foundation for every law enforcement action in the post-admission phase. If this fundamental instrument for recording and monitoring the stay permit period is paralyzed, law enforcement efforts will inevitably lose a valid database.

Although the state has established strict regulations regarding administrative oversight, various forms of immigration violations continue to occur in practice. The weak compliance of foreign nationals in reporting address changes is frequently exacerbated by cross-sectoral coordination constraints between the central and regional governments (Aktivanto et al., 2023; Nuriyatman et al., 2025; Bachtiar et al., 2026). The discrepancy between ideal legal norms and field realities indicates that the oversight system faces significant operational constraints. The desynchronization of immigration data and the limited monitoring capacity indicate that oversight has not operated proactively.

This phenomenon generates a specific anomaly in the immigration oversight mechanism at the regional operational level. The accumulation of highly strict oversight procedures at the initial admission stage is frequently not followed by adequate post-admission administrative surveillance mechanisms by field officers. This disproportionate situation creates post-admission blind spots that carry a high risk of triggering massive administrative violations. This anomaly indicates that the state administrative system has not responded instantaneously to the dynamics of foreign nationals' movements. Consequently, the authorities do not comprehensively monitor the presence of foreign nationals within the state's jurisdiction.

This issue demands an in-depth empirical legal study because it involves aspects of legal sovereignty and state administrative service standards. Institutional failure to detect administrative violations constitutes a form of structural maladministration that paralyzes state protection instruments. Administrative orders that comply with the

General Principles of Good Administration are an absolute prerequisite for successful law enforcement during the repressive phase. Therefore, an academic investigation into the determinants of this administrative early warning system's failure is highly urgent. This is intended to dissect whether the failure originates from technological infrastructure weaknesses or precisely from structural pressures on the apparatus itself.

Prior studies on the effectiveness of immigration oversight have been widely conducted, yet they still leave gaps in the geographical scope and depth of analysis of bureaucratic pathology. [Rahmadini and Suhardono \(2025\)](#) and [Rijal \(2025\)](#) have separately examined immigration law enforcement in the East Java region through operational studies in Surabaya and Kediri. Other empirical research generally highlights oversight dimensions only from the perspective of repressive enforcement or field operations. However, empirical studies on the anatomy of administrative paralysis in early warning systems in the Eastern Indonesia region, specifically in Makassar as a foreign maritime transit territory, have not been comprehensively addressed. The novelty of this research lies in the investigation of the post-admission administrative oversight blind spots phenomenon, integrating theoretical parameters from bureaucratic sociology and administrative law to position administrative defects as the primary preventive phase in detecting immigration violations.

Given the urgency of these issues, this research aims to empirically analyze the anatomy of administrative oversight blind spots within post-admission oversight mechanisms for foreign nationals at the Makassar Immigration Checkpoint. Furthermore, this research is intended to analyze the causal determinants of the functional paralysis of early warning systems in immigration institutions, specifically in relation to bureaucratic resource deficits, structural maladministration, and data integrity, resulting in high rates of overstay. The results of this research are expected to provide practical contributions for immigration policymakers in formulating holistic prevention-oriented oversight strategies. Academically, this research projects the enrichment of empirical immigration law literature concerning the urgency of administrative governance as the absolute foundation for state sovereignty enforcement.

## **METHOD**

This research employs empirical legal research enriched by a socio-legal approach and state administrative law scrutiny. This multi-layered analytical approach is applied to comprehend the processes, structural constraints, and implementation effectiveness of immigration regulations in light of field realities ([Qamar & Rezah, 2020](#)). This approach does not merely examine written norms dogmatically; rather, it gathers in-depth data on administrative oversight mechanisms grounded in the experiences and sociological pressures of frontline policy implementers ([Marzuki, 2017](#)). Through this method, the research objectively uncovers various structural

maladministration or anomalies unidentified within the formal procedures of the state bureaucracy.

The research location is the Class I Special Immigration Office of the Makassar Immigration Checkpoint. The selection of this locus is based on the jurisdiction's strategic position as the primary gateway for maritime transit and for massive-scale investments in the eastern Indonesian region. The high intensity of foreign traffic, coupled with dynamic demographic vulnerabilities, renders this institution relevant for precisely measuring the reliability of the oversight system. The geographical conditions and the high caseload provide an empirical foundation for dissecting the institutional capacity to execute comprehensive administrative control functions.

The data used in this research include both primary and secondary data to ensure the depth of analysis (Sampara & Husen, 2016). Primary data are obtained by extracting statements from key informants selected through purposive sampling. These informants include first-tier and middle-tier structural officers serving as immigration analysts, who are directly involved in the daily implementation of administrative oversight authority. Meanwhile, secondary data are collected by retrieving primary legal materials, specifically statutory instruments on Immigration and Law Number 30 of 2014. This data is supported by secondary legal materials, including reputable literature, to construct the theoretical framework and the research's intertextual dialogue position.


To avoid institutional bias that risks positioning bureaucratic apparatuses as the sole evaluators of their own performance, this research strictly applies a source-triangulation-based data collection technique. The primary data collection process through in-depth interviews is directly confronted with the objective reality of field law enforcement. The subjectivity of the apparatuses' views on the oversight system's capacity is examined using quantitative data on immigration violations, which realistically reflect the failure of foreign nationals to comply. Furthermore, field observations regarding the posture of human resource placement and the operational reliability of the information system are utilized to validate the absolute discrepancy between the normative legal mandates (*das sollen*) and the operational institutional realities (*das sein*).

The data analysis technique is conducted qualitatively and inductively, referencing the advanced guidelines for empirical legal article writing (Irwansyah, 2020). The classified empirical data is subsequently analyzed in depth using two layers of doctrinal parameters. First, evaluating the bureaucratic administrative output utilizing the General Principles of Good Administration (specifically the Principle of Carefulness). Second, dissecting the rationality of the implementing apparatuses' behavior using the sociology of law perspective regarding street-level bureaucracy. This analytical process is specifically focused on deciphering the causal links between blind spots and structural maladministration that paralyze early warning systems.

The synthesis of the dialectic between factual data and theoretical parameters is then systematically and critically narrated to formulate an objective conclusion regarding the fundamental weaknesses of state administrative governance in enforcing immigration sovereignty.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### A. The Anatomy of Administrative Blind Spots: The Admission and Post-Admission Discrepancy



*Figure 1. Flowchart of the Administrative Oversight Mechanism for Foreign Nationals*

The administrative oversight of foreign nationals at the Class I Special Immigration Office of the Makassar Immigration Checkpoint is normatively designed through a systematic operational workflow (Figure 1). This procedure integrates the functions of the Immigration Service Section at the port of entry with the Intelligence and Enforcement Section during the post-admission surveillance

phase. Procedurally, every arrival of a foreign legal subject must undergo a digital identification stage using the Face Recognition Integrated System (FRIS), which is directly interconnected with the Immigration Management Information System (SIMKIM). This cross-sectional workflow design assumes that the initial identity registration will continuously provide updated data for post-admission administrative surveillance (Kurniawan & Kurniawan, 2025).

The obligation of continuous surveillance constitutes an imperative mandate regulated in Article 172 section (4) letter b and letter d of Government Regulation Number 31 of 2013. This legal provision explicitly affirms that immigration oversight does not cease upon the foreign national's admission into or departure from Indonesian territory, but continues in effect as long as the subject remains within Indonesian territory and conducts activities within its national jurisdiction. This legal construction is a manifestation of the selective policy doctrine, under which the state possesses absolute authority to revoke stay conditions if a foreign national is found to have violated an administrative order in the post-admission phase (Santoso, 2014; Sutmasa, 2021).

Although legal infrastructure and digital tools are available, empirical realities in the field reveal operational anomalies that undermine the continuous oversight system. The sophistication of facial recognition technology at the port of entry is not balanced by proactive data synchronization once foreign nationals have assimilated into society. The most substantial operational discrepancy lies in the transition between the initial digital data registration and the reporting of address alterations, which remains highly dependent on the subjects' manual compliance. The fact regarding the paralysis of this cross-sectional proactive analytical function is empirically confirmed by MAW, serving as a Middle-Tier Immigration Analyst, stating that:

*"Systems such as FRIS or SIMKIM are highly effective for initial data registration or admission. However, the issue is that administrative oversight often degenerates into mere clerical routine at officers' desks. The data exists within the system, but the officers' capacity to proactively analyze that data before the foreign national commits a violation remains limited."*

This institutional admission proves that bureaucratic procedures have been reduced to static clerical data-entry routines. The apparatuses lose the capacity for early detection due to suboptimal integration of automatic alert systems at the regional institutional operational level, which should inherently be capable of instantaneously tracking the expirations of stay conditions. This data synchronization failure is exacerbated by the highly dynamic demographic characteristics of foreign nationals in the Makassar jurisdiction. The mobility of part-time workers and small-scale foreign investors relocating residences without conducting administrative reporting has created oversight blind spots for state

sovereignty (Aktivanto et al., 2023; Putri & Dzirusydi, 2026). The dynamics of these nomadic movements eluding administrative reach are technically elucidated by ADM, serving as a First-Tier Immigration Analyst, stating that:

*“Tourists frequently transfer between hotels; sometimes they do not reside in a single location. Secondly, regarding foreign nationals working or serving as investors in Makassar, they occasionally fail to report address mutations. Because for every data alteration, the concerned subject must report it. We only discover their address changes when they intend to extend their stay or are apprehended for overstay. The blind spots lie therein; we lose contact with their movements.”*

The officers’ admission of the dynamic nomadic movements of these foreign legal subjects constitutes a demographic fact, confirmed by the objective reality of field law enforcement. The severance of oversight contact resulting from the failure to integrate manual address reporting into the digital system demonstrates that the administrative oversight architecture in Makassar is structurally paralyzed at the subsequent implementation stage. The absence of updated tracking instruments leaves the state unable to control foreign nationals who may be involved in various social anomalies (Sapiddin et al., 2021). These administrative blind spots represent a tangible bureaucratic pathology, the preventive failure of which can be mathematically proven through the high rate of overstay.

## **B. The Paralysis of Early Warning Systems: Rationalization of Administrative Violations**

The concrete manifestation of the previously elucidated administrative blind spots can be precisely traced through law enforcement’s quantitative instruments. Although the compliance level of foreign nationals during the admission phase is classified as highly elevated, the reality during the post-admission surveillance phase shows a clear degradation in compliance. This discrepancy is confirmed by the immigration enforcement track record, which reflects the early warning system surveillance capacity weakness within the jurisdiction of the Class I Special Immigration Office of the Makassar Immigration Checkpoint, as presented in Table 1.

**Table 1. Types of Administrative Immigration Violations within the Jurisdiction of the Class I Special Immigration Office of the Makassar Immigration Checkpoint (2024-2025)**

No	Type of Administrative Violation	Description	Number of Cases	Percentage
1	Overstay	The most prevalent violation, generally by tourists and permit holders	22	62.9%
2	Misuse of stay conditions	Working utilizing visit/tourist visas	6	17.1%

No	Type of Administrative Violation	Description	Number of Cases	Percentage
3	Delays in stay condition extensions	Administration submitted belatedly	3	8.6%
4	Document data discrepancies	Identity inconsistencies within immigration documents	4	11.4%
<b>Total</b>			<b>35</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Source: Processed Secondary Data, 2026.

The domination of overstay, reaching 62.9%, constitutes a signal of structural anomalies. The high number of violations during the final stages of the permit validity period reflects the sociological and economic motives of the foreign violators. The majority of this violator cohort hold the status of ex-part-time workers and small-scale investors, both of which exhibit high spatial mobility. Economic demands cause them to live nomadically, which in practice neglects the mandates of Article 71 section (1) letter a of Law Number 6 of 2011 *juncto* Article 106 point 8 of Law Number 6 of 2023, concerning the obligation to report address mutations. When bureaucratic surveillance instruments lose reach over these nomadic movements, administrative action sanctions and penalty charges, as regulated in Article 78, become consequences that elude the system’s preventive reach (Pigayanti et al., 2023; Saiful et al., 2024).

Technically, SIMKIM possesses the functional capacity to identify foreign nationals whose stay conditions are approaching expiration. However, the high accumulation of violations at the final stage of the stay condition period empirically demonstrates that the system’s utility is impaired by delays in real-time data updates. The system designed to detect potential behavioral anomalies of foreign nationals before material violations occur operates statically as a passive registration instrument (Ninage & Diamantina, 2022). Administrative orders within this institution remain confined to the formality of clerical documentation, losing their control effectiveness at the field implementation stage.

Furthermore, the surveillance capacity weakness during this critical phase also prejudices foreign nationals who intend to comply. This is reflected in the 8.6% rate of delays in stay condition extensions. Under the universal immigration law doctrine, the obligation to remember the absolute expiration of stay conditions (strict liability) constitutes the responsibility of the foreign subjects and their sponsors. Nevertheless, the absence of active notification mechanisms from the bureaucratic authority reflects suboptimal standards in state administrative services. The omission of stay condition data approaching expiration without any proactive efforts from the state constitutes a form of violation against the Principle of Carefulness, as mandated in Article 10 section (1) letter d of Law Number 30 of 2014. Ridwan (2006) asserts that bureaucratic actions must be based on updated

information and meticulously prepared to provide legal certainty. The state must be present not solely as a repressive sanction-imposing entity, but also as a compliance facilitator in the preventive phase (Amalia & Sugito, 2023; Sihombing et al., 2024).

The systematic error reflected in the domination of overstay rates and the neglect of the Principle of Carefulness constitutes a manifestation of the apparatus's inability within the system to accommodate the surveillance burden exceeding its capacity. Therefore, the analysis of these weak early warning systems necessitates further elucidation of the human resources posture and bureaucratic routines that restrict the capacity of the field apparatuses.

### **C. The Causality of Human Resource Deficits and Post-Admission Surveillance Dysfunction**

The paralysis of early warning systems and the domination of administrative violations identified in the preceding analysis correlate with structural determinants internal to the immigration institution. Based on field observation results, the determining factor in this oversight dysfunction is the human resource allocation posture, which is concentrated on admission functions at the port of entry. This disproportionate allocation at the Immigration Checkpoint results in a significant personnel deficit within the Immigration Intelligence and Enforcement Section. This condition disrupts the implementation of the mandate in Article 181 of Government Regulation Number 48 of 2021 concerning field surveillance. In modern immigration doctrine, this article mandates risk-based surveillance (intelligence-led monitoring). However, due to the human resource deficit in the intelligence frontline, the capacity to conduct proactive risk mapping becomes ineffective.

In practice, the risk-based field surveillance mandate is constrained by demographic realities and geographical impediments borne by intelligence apparatuses. The imbalance between the oversight object volume and the human resource posture disrupts the surveillance cycle. This operational constraint regarding the disproportionate span of control is acknowledged by ADM, stating that:

*"... because immigration officers within the oversight division are limited in contrast to the jurisdiction covering five regencies and one city; this also becomes our constraint in the administrative oversight process regarding foreign nationals."*

The vastness of the operational jurisdiction coverage, unbalanced by the availability of field intelligence personnel, shifts the oversight orientation from proactive-preventive to passive-reactive. The logical consequence of this institutional posture is the erosion of the oversight unit's capacity to organize a continuous surveillance cycle. When institutional energy is concentrated on

resolving administration at the initial admission counters, field verification procedures to validate the physical presence of foreign nationals are marginalized. The causal relationship between the institutional initial admission caseload and the paralysis of subsequent detection is confirmed by MAW, stating that:

*“Empirically, our officers are heavily burdened in the admission and examination sections at the Immigration Checkpoint. Consequently, the post-admission administrative surveillance function is frequently neglected. We possess data that stay conditions are nearing expiration, but due to the lack of personnel to conduct verifications or actively provide early warnings, foreign nationals are ultimately only detected after they commit overstay.”*

From a sociology of law perspective, the phenomenon of caseload accumulation, leading to the neglect of the apparatuses’ continuous surveillance function, provides empirical support for the street-level bureaucracy theory conceptualized by [Lipsky \(2010\)](#). Under this doctrine, frontline bureaucrats confronted with limited resources and caseloads exceeding reasonable ratios tend to modify their work routines as a defense mechanism. Immigration officers in Makassar modify standard operating procedures into static clerical routines to accommodate the existing quantity of work. This phenomenon corroborates the fundamental postulate by [Soekanto \(1983\)](#) that the integrity of legal norms will inevitably be paralyzed if the “law enforcement factor” fails to sustain the implementation burden in the field. Although this routine modification is sociologically comprehensible due to caseload pressures, it cannot be legally justified. The omission regarding personnel deficits in the intelligence frontline and the nullity of mitigation system optimization constitute a form of structural maladministration that cannot be normalized.

Bureaucratic dysfunction caused by the law-enforcement staffing deficit is also an issue in other operational jurisdictions ([Sari, 2022](#); [Rijal, 2025](#)). The imbalance between caseload and personnel capacity creates systemic vulnerabilities that undermine the authority of immigration law as a whole ([Aji et al., 2022](#); [Rahmadini & Suhardono, 2025](#)). As a consequence of the low independent surveillance capacity, immigration institutions depend on external party synergy. This structural dependency subsequently indicates a weakness in the ensuing preventive instrument, namely the effectiveness of cross-agency coordination.

#### **D. Coordination Failures and Repressive Measures as the Repressive Phase**

Due to the low independent surveillance capacity, immigration institutions depend on cross-sectoral coordination mechanisms. The institutional forum for this synergy is manifested through the establishment of the Foreigners Oversight Team (*Tim Pengawasan Orang Asing/TimPORA*). Conceptually, TimPORA is designed to mitigate physical surveillance limitations by enabling collaborative

information exchange among various law enforcement agencies and regional governments. However, operational realities within the Makassar jurisdiction demonstrate that this coordination instrument has not functioned optimally as a preventive measure and is constrained by reactive approaches.

This reactive operational pattern is indicated by the absence of a continuous administrative data exchange mechanism. Inter-agency collaboration tends to materialize only when an immigration violation has accumulated into a disruption of public order and security, or is limited to periodic joint operations. The fact regarding this coordination dysfunction is critically acknowledged by MAW, stating that:

*“Honestly, much remains reactive. We frequently receive reports after a problem occurs. My future expectation is that this coordination must be based on routine administrative data exchange, not merely during joint operations every three months. We require more solid data integration to close security loopholes emerging from the desynchronization of inter-institutional information.”*

This empirical admission proves the occurrence of structural disruptions against the mandate of Article 180 section (3) of Government Regulation Number 31 of 2013. This provision imperatively obligates that data and information in the Immigration Management Information System (SIMKIM) be accessible to relevant government agencies or institutions in accordance with their respective duties and functions. This legal mandate requires establishing cross-sector interoperability in information technology, with real-time data exchange (Bachtiar et al., 2026). The absence of this integrated digital infrastructure causes the immigration institution to fail in supplying precise early warning data to the TimPORA forum. Consequently, the actual pathology lies in the quality of the administrative data supply, which causes other law enforcement agencies to operate partially and act reactively when conflicts have escalated (Nuriyatman et al., 2025).

Delays in data exchange and low surveillance capacity in the post-admission phase ultimately result in repressive measures during the repressive phase. Under the universal immigration law doctrine, administrative measures in the form of deportation constitute an absolute manifestation of state sovereignty in enforcing the law (Praditya, 2025). Nevertheless, the heavy reliance on these repressive instruments to address the domination of overstays indicates an imbalance between the preventive and enforcement phases of the prevention system. When repressive sanctions dominate case handling, legal violations and threats to state sovereignty have occurred within social dynamics (Mayang et al., 2021). This condition confirms that administrative oversight in the jurisdiction has lost its preventive essence as the primary instrument of sovereignty control, and is degraded into an administrative complement to enforcement efforts (Satriawan et al., 2025).

Holistically, anomalies in oversight mechanisms in Makassar demonstrate that state sovereignty cannot be maintained solely by tightening examination procedures at the territorial port of entry. The administrative data synchronization failure, the field intelligence human resource posture deficit resulting from the transformation of officers' roles into data analysts, and the dysfunction of inter-agency system interoperability constitute interconnected structural maladministration. The omission of this dysfunction confirms the vulnerability of the state's legal defense architecture in confronting the complexity of global mobility in Indonesia (Irwanto et al., 2025).

## **CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS**

Based on the synthesis of empirical data and doctrinal analysis, the administrative oversight mechanisms for foreign nationals within the jurisdiction of the Class I Special Immigration Office of the Makassar Immigration Checkpoint are found to be structurally paralyzed during the post-admission surveillance phase. Although initial identification at the port of entry operates optimally, the bureaucratic system has not responded instantaneously to the dynamics of nomadic movements of foreign legal subjects. The absence of up-to-date data synchronization creates blind spots that lead to overstay. The paralysis of these early warning systems constitutes a tangible manifestation of a violation of the Principle of Carefulness, in which administrative order operates passively and loses its control effectiveness. The heavy reliance on deportation sanctions at the final stage of the stay condition validity period confirms that oversight instruments lose their preventive essence and become focused on reactive, repressive measures.

The paralysis of these preventive instruments correlates with two primary causal determinants: the imbalance in the human resource posture and the absence of interoperability in information technology. The concentration of apparatuses on initial admission functions has caused the field intelligence frontline to experience a significant personnel deficit. This condition results in the modification of oversight routines, from inherently proactive to static clerical routines, as an apparatus defense mechanism in confronting the disproportionate caseload. This structural maladministration is exacerbated by the inability of the Immigration Management Information System (SIMKIM) to integrate in real-time with other law enforcement agencies and regional governments. As a consequence of the institution's failure to supply precise analytical data, the cross-sectoral coordination forum loses its function as a preventive instrument, instead operating reactively when violations have occurred.

Responding to this structural maladministration, the immigration institution must conduct a paradigm reorientation towards risk-based and intelligence-led monitoring. In practice, human resource allocation must be restructured by reinforcing the intelligence unit's posture, accompanied by transforming officers'

roles into administrative data analysts. This transformation constitutes an absolute prerequisite for restoring the function of early warning systems. Furthermore, to address the findings regarding the violation against the Principle of Carefulness, the government needs to intervene regulatorily. A legal framework renewal is required, mandating real-time cross-agency exchange of demographic and immigration data, so that coordination synergy no longer relies on sectoral initiatives but on absolute legal obligations. Academically, this research recommends further studies on the effectiveness of state administrative system interoperability to ensure that legal authority can be comprehensively enforced in the preventive phase, rather than solely through repressive measures in the repressive phase.

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