



SIGn Journal of Social Science

E-ISSN: 2745-374X

jurnal.penerbitsign.com/index.php/sjss/article/view/v4n1-05

Vol. 4 Issue 1: June – November 2023

Published Online: November 23, 2023

Article Title

The Split-Ticket Voting Phenomenon: Analyzing Internal Voter Factors in the Central-Provincial House of Representatives Election

Author(s)

Abd. Kahar Muzakkir*

CV. Social Politic Genius (SIGn)

Umami Suci Fathia Bailusy

Universitas Hasanuddin

***Correspondence Email**

muzakkir.abd.kahar@gmail.com

How to cite:

Muzakkir, A. K., & Bailusy, U. S. F. (2023). The Split-Ticket Voting Phenomenon: Analyzing Internal Voter Factors in the Central-Provincial House of Representatives Election. *SIGn Journal of Social Science*, 4(1), 69-86. <https://doi.org/10.37276/sjss.v4i1.333>



This work is licensed under a [CC BY-4.0 License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

ABSTRACT

This research aims to analyze the phenomenon of split-ticket voting in the Central–Provincial House of Representatives election of 2019 in Makassar City based on internal voter factors. This research uses an inductive qualitative analysis. Inductive analysis is an approach that begins with field facts, analyzes them based on relevant theories and arguments, and ultimately yields a conclusion. The results show that voters demonstrated a rational or strategic approach to ticket-splitting in the Central–Provincial House of Representatives election 2019 in Makassar City. Four significant internal factors influence this phenomenon. The strength of the partisanship factor indicates that voters tend to assess candidates for the Central–Provincial House of Representatives based on individual character and achievements rather than political party loyalty. Furthermore, incumbency information reveals voters' pragmatic behavior based on rational choices to gain personal benefits. On the other hand, the strategic/policy balancing factor shows the significant influence of non-positional candidate characteristics in voter decisions. Finally, campaigns and socialization play a crucial role through strategic coordination among candidates for the Central–Provincial House of Representatives, political nodes, and voters, emphasizing the importance of narratives constructed through direct interactions and political gossip in securing voter support. Therefore, it is recommended that candidates for the Central–Provincial House of Representatives from the same political party enhance collaboration and coordination to create straight-ticket voting for their voters. Meanwhile, it is essential for political nodes to strengthen coordination that prioritizes transparency and integrity in conveying information. On the other hand, voters should be encouraged to actively seek information about candidates' track records and policies to make decisions based more on substantial judgment than the influence of political gossip or short-term incentives. These steps are expected to reduce the phenomenon of split-ticket voting in the simultaneous elections for the coming period in Makassar City.

Keywords: Political Party; Simultaneous Elections; Split-Ticket Voting; Voter Behavior.

INTRODUCTION

Direct elections in the reform era are a crucial step in the practice of democracy in Indonesia. These elections aim to produce representatives who embody the people's sovereignty in the executive and legislative branches of power at various levels (Muzakkir et al., 2021). This process occurs through a mechanism clearly defined and based on the open-list proportional system (Muhtamar & Bachmid, 2022). This system facilitates multiparty competition, offering greater opportunities for political parties to actively participate in the electoral arena (Wono et al., 2022). Such involvement not only enriches the democratic process but also strengthens a more representative political structure.

In the context of socialization, political parties play a significant role in disseminating their values to the public. It aims to build strong support that will influence the outcome of the elections (Husen et al., 2022). This process simplifies the analysis of election results and the effectiveness of their conduct. However, achieving this is not without challenges. An effective political party must be led by strong leadership and requires measured cooperation (Aylott & Bolin, 2021). This leadership and cooperation are essential to unify the vision in the executive and legislative branches of power at various levels, enabling political parties to optimize their vote acquisition (Basri, 2021).

The electoral strategy desired by political parties involves creating uniformity of choice among their voters, known as straight-ticket voting (Gorelkina et al., 2023). This strategy aims to minimize the phenomenon of split-ticket voting, where voters divide their votes among multiple political parties in elections at various branches or levels of power. Meanwhile, the behavior of voters dividing their votes is called ticket-splitting. This phenomenon reflects voter behavior that is increasingly critical and independent in making political decisions (Cantoni et al., 2021). The strategy demonstrates the complexity of interactions between political parties and voters within a continuously evolving democracy and highlights the importance of political party adaptability and responsiveness to electoral dynamics.

Furthermore, the phenomenon of split-ticket voting has significant implications for analyzing the performance of political parties and their influence in various branches of power. The assumptions underlying this phenomenon underscore the importance of political parties in responding to and capturing the aspirations of citizens (Gaivoronsky, 2023). Consolidating voter desires within the internal structure of political parties is critical to minimizing ticket-splitting. On the other hand, ticket-splitting is essential in studying voting behavior and is an integral part of political science (Stumpf, 2020). Voter behavior that divides votes among several political parties at various branches or levels of power shows more complex political dynamics. This phenomenon raises questions about the factors driving voters to choose candidates from more than one political party in simultaneous elections (Kim, 2023). The reasons for voters engaging in ticket-splitting can vary from sincere to strategic motives, indicating that voters may see their decisions as a way to achieve optimal political outcomes or to support a political party identity without sacrificing individual preferences on specific issues (Persson, 2020).

Gschwend and Kolk (2006) identified factors influencing ticket-splitting, dividing them into supply-side and demand-side factors. Supply-side factors include actions by political parties and candidates in presenting themselves to voters, whereas demand-side factors encompass the responses and needs of the voters themselves. Understanding both sides of these factors allows for an analysis of how external and internal voter factors interact and influence the decision to engage in ticket-splitting. This analysis is crucial for understanding how voters respond to the policies and strategies implemented by political parties, and how these factors shape the phenomenon of split-ticket voting.

The study of the split-ticket voting phenomenon in the context of elections in Indonesia offers a new perspective in understanding the political dynamics of voters. Qodari (2016) is the first researcher to examine the phenomenon of split-ticket voting in different branches of power or the House of Representatives–Presidential election of 2014 using the Low Information Model approach. According to this model, ticket-splitting occurs not due to decisions made based on rational considerations

or electoral strategy, but is more influenced by “cues” or noticeable elements such as the voter’s proximity to a political party or fondness for a particular House of Representatives–Presidential candidate. For example, a voter may choose a House of Representatives candidate from X Party, but for President, they choose a candidate from Y Party, which is not a coalition of X Party, solely because they like the candidate without deep strategic consideration.

On the other hand, research on split-ticket voting in Indonesia tends to focus on elections in different branches of power and exercised at different times. However, studies on the same branch of power and exercised simultaneously are still very minimal. This condition is interesting to explore further, especially in the Central–Provincial House of Representatives election that is exercised simultaneously. Specifically, in Makassar, there are two constituencies for the Provincial House of Representatives election, namely South Sulawesi 1 (Makassar A) constituency and South Sulawesi 2 (Makassar B) constituency.

In the Central–Provincial House of Representatives election of 2019, the phenomenon of split-ticket voting in Makassar showed significant figures in both constituencies. For instance, the National Democrat Party (NasDem Party) recorded the highest percentage of split-ticket voting at 51.11% in the Makassar A constituency, while the National Awakening Party (PKB Party) led with 59.32% in the Makassar B constituency. This data provides empirical evidence that split-ticket voting is a natural phenomenon and substantially influences the dynamics of elections, enriching the understanding of voting patterns at the voter base level.

Based on the description above, this research aims to analyze the phenomenon of split-ticket voting in the Central–Provincial House of Representatives election of 2019 in Makassar City based on internal voter factors. The benefit of this research is to provide a deeper understanding of voter dynamics in the same branch of power and exercised simultaneously. Thus, the results of this research are expected to contribute to the strategies of political parties in designing campaigns and enhancing the effectiveness of their approaches to voters, as well as providing insights to policymakers to understand voter tendencies in simultaneous elections.

METHOD

This research uses a qualitative approach to understand groups of people, objects, situations, conditions, ongoing events, and even thought systems (Whitney, 1960). This research was conducted in Makassar City. This research utilized both primary and secondary data sources. Data was collected through interviews with key informants, field observations, literature study techniques, and document analysis concerning the phenomenon of split-ticket voting and voter behavior in elections. The acquired data was then analyzed using inductive qualitative analysis. Inductive

analysis is an approach that begins with field facts, analyzes them based on relevant theories and arguments, and ultimately yields a conclusion (Neuman, 2003).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In the Central–Provincial House of Representatives election of 2019, a significant percentage of split-ticket voting occurred in Makassar City. Here are the split-ticket voting percentages for both constituencies.

Table 1. Percentage of Split-Ticket Voting in the Central–Provincial House of Representatives Election of 2019 in Makassar City by Political Party that Won Seats in the Central House of Representatives

No	Political Party	Makassar A Constituency		Makassar B Constituency	
		F	%	F	%
1	PKB	2,842	11.75%	6,716	59.32%
2	Gerindra	11,308	19.56%	5,739	13.21%
3	PDI-P	11,019	28.34%	8,041	27.19%
4	Golkar	3,523	8.76%	14,891	33.49%
5	NasDem	51,740	51.11%	2,478	6.33%
6	PPP	7,015	23.91%	4,372	29.46%
7	PAN	11,470	38.09%	2,584	12.47%
8	Democrat	14,706	34.62%	5,547	20.44%

Source: Data compiled from Recapitulation Model DA1, *General Election Commission of Makassar Municipal (2019)*.

According to Table 1 above, the phenomenon of split-ticket voting between the two constituencies shows significant differences in voter behavior regarding ticket-splitting. The PKB Party displays split-ticket voting with extreme variability, with a low percentage of 11.75% in Makassar A constituency, and a very high figure reaching 59.32% in Makassar B constituency. Similarly, the Functional Groups Party (Golkar Party) shows low split-ticket voting figures of 8.76% in Makassar A constituency and high figures of 33.49% in Makassar B constituency.

Conversely, the NasDem Party shows high split-ticket voting figures of 51.11% in Makassar A constituency and a deficient 6.33% in Makassar B. Similarly, the National Mandate Party (PAN Party) displays high split-ticket voting percentages of 38.09% in Makassar A constituency and low figures of 12.47% in Makassar B constituency. The split-ticket voting phenomenon between the two constituencies in Makassar City indicates a muscular misalignment between voter choices in the Central–Provincial House of Representatives election.

On the other hand, individual factors play a crucial role in the split-ticket voting phenomenon in the Central–Provincial House of Representatives election in Makassar City. Several factors influence ticket-splitting behavior, including the

strength of partisanship (Moskowitz, 2021), incumbency information (Chou et al., 2021), strategic/policy balancing (Woods, 2022), and the effectiveness of campaigns and socialization (Oshri et al., 2023). Voter behavior reflected through ticket-splitting indicates deep consideration in elections, where voters do not merely follow the lines of political parties but also evaluate the merits of candidates, the policies offered, and the potential to create balance in government. This phenomenon underscores the importance of individual aspects in influencing voter decisions, which tend to be increasingly independent and critical of their political choices.

A. Strength of Partisanship Factor

In the context of split-ticket voting, the strength of voter partisanship towards a particular political party is an essential factor influencing the decision to engage in ticket-splitting. Specifically in Makassar City, this analysis focuses on the relationship between voters and political parties based on data from the Central Provincial House of Representatives election of 2019. This connection is crucial to identifying how voter proximity to a specific political party can affect their voting patterns at the subdistrict level in Makassar City.

Analyzing the split-ticket voting phenomenon becomes more intriguing when directed at political parties competing in Indonesian elections for at least two periods. These long-established political parties tend to have a solid and coordinated support base (Mazzoleni & Heinisch, 2023), which facilitates the analysis of ticket-splitting patterns. For example, six political parties received dominant votes for the candidate for the Central House of Representatives in the South Sulawesi 1 constituency, including the PKB Party, Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra Party), Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P Party), Golkar Party, PAN Party, and Democrat Party.

However, the NasDem Party and United Development Party (PPP Party) are less attractive for analysis. As a newer political party, NasDem Party voters tend to have a voting pattern highly influenced by candidates' individual charisma rather than the political party's coordination strength. The PPP Party, although not a new political party, has a unique characteristic where its dominance in votes is not found in Makassar City but in Gowa Regency. This condition makes these two political parties less relevant for analysis in the context of voter partisanship strength in Makassar City, considering that the existing data and dynamics do not support a comprehensive analysis of ticket-splitting based on voter partisanship strength towards political parties.

Table 2. Percentage of Split-Ticket Voting in the Central-Provincial House of Representatives Election of 2019 in Makassar City by Subdistrict Level

Subdistrict	PKB		Gerindra		PDI-P		Golkar		PAN		Democrat	
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
Bontoala (100%)	377	22.90%	894	22.81%	1,028	33.80%	611	18.60%	488	26.19%	965	36.54%
Sangkarrang Islands (100%)	21	4.53%	567	52.02%	22	9.69%	823	83.81%	59	11.85%	237	40.58%
Makassar (99.5%)	957	37.81%	343	6.65%	1,915	40.50%	995	19.38%	1,497	51.78%	1,858	47.76%
Mamajang (100%)	418	25.52%	1,378	29.64%	935	27.51%	1,496	36.69%	751	45.96%	1,275	41.22%
Mariso (100%)	320	22.19%	1,015	25.12%	623	26.49%	209	8.10%	1,229	44.13%	1,585	45.78%
Rapocini (100%)	922	19.59%	3,338	23.89%	1,648	23.27%	2,346	29.86%	2,194	35.17%	2,501	30.55%
Tallo (100%)	798	17.37%	1,652	18.62%	2,335	43.16%	879	12.28%	1,906	31.15%	1,828	25.63%
Tamalate (100%)	795	14.30%	2,643	20.84%	1,120	16.40%	236	3.47%	2,752	42.58%	3,326	34.15%
Ujung Pandang (100%)	58	9.91%	230	13.48%	606	22.55%	535	49.72%	109	33.64%	633	48.47%
Ujung Tanah (99%)	127	8.03%	830	35.88%	600	39.45%	500	19.69%	426	30.60%	399	19.60%
Wajo (98.9%)	6	1.15%	267	14.65%	799	25.31%	765	36.83%	345	42.28%	527	37.09%
Biring Kanaya (100%)	1,728	57.64%	648	4.37%	3,013	31.31%	3,778	32.11%	1,277	15.79%	241	2.43%
Manggala (100%)	2,569	68.47%	2,303	19.87%	862	12.66%	8,882	55.54%	1,515	24.96%	2,899	39.68%
Panakkukang (100%)	1,922	58.49%	2,306	21.40%	2,741	31.00%	2,114	24.57%	526	11.45%	1,283	19.15%
Tamalanrea (100%)	659	47.58%	1,204	16.65%	1,530	32.07%	1,842	20.62%	174	5.75%	1,491	36.91%

Source: Data compiled from Recapitulation Model DA1, *General Election Commission of Makassar Municipal (2019)*.

Table 2 data shows that the PKB Party only has closeness with voters in four subdistricts, namely Ujung Pandang Subdistrict, Wajo Subdistrict, Ujung Tanah Subdistrict, and Sangkarrang Islands Subdistrict. All these subdistricts are territories of Makassar A constituency. On the other hand, 11 other subdistricts show minimal closeness of voters with the PKB Party, indicating that generally, the PKB Party has limited influence in Makassar City.

For the Gerindra Party, the split-ticket voting phenomenon is apparent only at the Central House of Representatives level, without spilling over to the Provincial House of Representatives level. Closeness with the Gerindra Party is only monitored in two subdistricts, namely Makassar Subdistrict and Biringkanaya Subdistrict, indicating no effective tandem pattern within the Gerindra Party. This suggests that voters in Makassar City do not generally have significant closeness with the Gerindra Party.

At the Central House of Representatives level, voters engage in ticket-splitting for the PDI-P Party at all subdistrict levels in Makassar City. The coattail effect appears effective at the Central House of Representatives level, except in the Sangkarrang Islands Subdistrict, where a tandem pattern between candidates for the Central-Provincial House of Representatives is identified as effective. This condition indicates that the PDI-P Party has a more dominant position than other

political parties in the context of voter distance from political parties in Makassar City.

For the Golkar Party, the dominance of split-ticket voting occurs more at the Provincial House of Representatives level, with voter closeness only identified in two subdistricts, namely Mariso Subdistrict and Tamalate Subdistrict. The split rate is relatively high in other subdistricts, indicating minimal voter closeness with the Golkar Party in Makassar City. A similar pattern occurs with the PAN Party and Democrat Party, where closeness is only monitored in Tamalanrea Subdistrict for the PAN Party and Biringkanaya Subdistrict for the Democrat Party, indicating that generally, voter closeness with these two political parties is relatively low in Makassar City.

Furthermore, Ibnu states that most candidates in Makassar City operate independently without significant coordination with candidates for the House of Representatives from the same political party at all levels.¹ For example, candidates for the Provincial House of Representatives campaign only for their vote acquisition, without collaborating with candidates for the Central House of Representatives from that political party. This phenomenon reflects minimal closeness or strategic relationship between voters and political parties, resulting in a lack of candidate effort to promote straight-ticket voting.

On the other hand, Amri asserts that voters in Makassar City prioritize the quality of individual candidates over their political party affiliations.² Voters are more likely to choose based on personal merit and the social influence demonstrated by candidates. This opinion indicates a pattern of ticket-splitting, where voters are not bound to one political party and focus more on the attributes and personal contributions of candidates in voting decisions.

Thus, voter partisanship strength towards political parties is minimal in the Central–Provincial House of Representatives election of 2019 in Makassar City. In contrast, the concept of political party identification in the theory of social political psychology explains that voters tend to support political parties or candidates that align with their political identities (Jenke & Huettel, 2020). However, in this context, voters are more driven by individual factors such as the character and achievements of candidates rather than their political party affiliations. It indicates a transition in voting behavior from political party allegiance to individual evaluation, showing a more rational and personal preference in election decision-making (Cunow et al., 2021). Therefore, internal voter factors like personal assessments of integrity and social contributions of candidates are more crucial than political party loyalty, impacting the prevalence of ticket-splitting as a voting phenomenon more based on character evaluation than political party allegiance.

¹Interview Results with a Political Node in Makassar City. Ibnu, on September 2, 2021.

²Interview Results with a Political Node in Makassar City. Syaiful Amri, on September 18, 2021.

B. Information Incumbency Factor

The phenomenon of split-ticket voting in Makassar City can be understood through the lens of internal voter factors, particularly incumbency information. Information about a candidate's reputation, capabilities, and track record is a crucial element that influences voter political decisions (Marua & Muzakkir, 2023). Voters are expected to obtain detailed data about the potential and achievements of candidates to make informed choices in the Central-Provincial House of Representatives election of 2019 in Makassar City.

Moreover, the socioeconomic strata represented by candidates also play a significant role in determining voter preferences. Information about a candidate's socioeconomic status often correlates with the acceptance of money politics practices (Okeke & Nwali, 2020). The presence of direct incentives often serves as an additional consideration for voters when weighing one candidate against another (Septiadi et al., 2021).

Information from Lau about voter behavior in ticket-splitting adds a dimension to this understanding. Voters often consider the individual figure of candidates at each House of Representatives level.³ For instance, a voter may choose a candidate for the Central House of Representatives from the PAN Party due to their capabilities, but select a candidate for the Provincial House of Representatives from the Prosperous Justice Party due to their religious background as a cleric. Such an approach shows that voters assess not only general capacities but also personal factors and social identities represented by each candidate.

On the other hand, Malik highlights that many voters attend campaign events primarily to ensure they receive direct incentives in the form of money politics.⁴ Their presence at these events is often driven by a desire to gain material benefits rather than ideological allegiance or political support. This opinion indicates that this phenomenon is not merely a transaction between candidates and voters but reflects a pragmatic practice that has taken root in Indonesia's open-list proportional system. This expression, which may seem outdated, actually depicts a political reality that is hard to deny, where money politics becomes a common medium of transaction between candidates and voters. In this case, voters are not just victims but also active players who maintain and even promote the continuation of this practice (Jati, 2022).

In the discourse on split-ticket voting and incumbency information factors, Amri offers a different perspective related to voting behavior. The tendency of voters to receive direct incentives in the form of money politics cannot simply be viewed as wrongful.⁵ This behavior is also influenced by broader social and political

³Interview Results with an Islamic Political Activist in Makassar City. Muchtar dg. Lau, on September 15, 2021.

⁴Interview Results with a Political Node in Makassar City. Malik, on September 14, 2021.

⁵Interview Results with a Political Node in Makassar City. Syaiful Amri, on September 18, 2021.

conditions, especially reports of rampant corruption among officials. In this case, voters act pragmatically not without reason. The prevalence of corruption news in the media indicates that corrupt behavior has become the norm among officials, so it is natural for voters to try to take advantage of a system they perceive as corrupt. It creates an irony where voters are considered culpable for accepting incentives, while corrupt behavior in the government appears to be accepted with little condemnation.

Furthermore, this paradox in pragmatic voter behavior reflects a response to existing conditions. Media-reported misuse of state funds by officials makes voters feel that taking the opportunity to receive political incentives is a rational choice. This situation creates a vicious circle where corruption and money politics mutually reinforce each other in the election dynamics, influencing voter behavior in the process of ticket-splitting.

Thus, incumbency information and the pragmatic behavior of voters in Makassar City become critical determinants in the phenomenon of split-ticket voting. Rational Choice Theory, developed by [Downs \(1957\)](#), provides a valuable framework for understanding how voters maximize personal benefits based on available information. This analysis reveals that voters are influenced not only by the capabilities and reputation of candidates but also by the dynamics of money politics as a reflection of broader political conditions, characterized by corruption and abuse of power ([Setiyawan & Mashdurohatun, 2021](#)). This pragmatic voter behavior reflects a rational response to a perceived corrupt political system, where voters strive to capitalize on every opportunity candidates present, thus influencing their voting patterns in the Central–Provincial House of Representatives election 2019.

C. Strategic/Policy Balancing Factor

The split-ticket voting phenomenon in the Central–Provincial House of Representatives election of 2019 in Makassar City reflects variability in candidates' strategies and political stances. In this city, candidates often do not fully adhere to the political party platform but rather adapt their approaches to coordinate support in specific areas. This phenomenon, known as strategic/policy balancing, is evident in how candidates interact with voters and exploit existing perceptions ([Darkwa, 2019](#)). Some candidates at all levels demonstrate alignment with other candidates or political party platforms, while others distance themselves from their party platforms to highlight their character ([Riera & Cantú, 2022](#)).

Amri describes how strategic/policy balancing influences voter choices in various areas of Makassar City, particularly for candidates from the PAN Party.⁶ Ashabul Kahfi, a candidate for the Central House of Representatives from the PAN

⁶Interview Results with a Political Node in Makassar City. Syaiful Amri, on September 18, 2021.

Party in the South Sulawesi 1 constituency, has a close connection with voters in Kassi-Kassi Urban Village, facilitating political coordination and strengthening support. Conversely, Nur Kanita Maruddani, a candidate for the Provincial House of Representatives from the PAN Party in the Makassar A constituency and the child of Ashabul Kahfi, faces challenges in the same territory due to a lack of distinction between her and her father. The lack of coordination of her campaign team with voters in the location also contributes to decreased support for Nur Kanita Maruddani.

The split-ticket voting phenomenon becomes more complex when voters consider candidates from other political parties. In Kassi-Kassi Urban Village, although the PAN Party has established its influence through Ashabul Kahfi, most voters shifted their support to Rachmatika Dewi, a candidate for the Provincial House of Representatives from the NasDem Party in the Makassar A constituency. Voters believe that Rachmatika Dewi has a better chance of being elected as a Provincial House of Representatives member in the Makassar A constituency than Nur Kanita Maruddani. A similar occurrence happens in Tidung Urban Village, where support for the candidate for the Provincial House of Representatives shifts from the PAN Party to the NasDem Party. This condition shows how strategic/policy balancing factors play a role in the ticket-splitting process, where voters decide based on the strategies and policies they deem most beneficial.

On the other hand, the split-ticket voting phenomenon is closely related to voters' evaluation of candidates. In Indonesia, the open-list proportional system with low Party ID affects how voters assess candidates, where factors such as intelligence, honesty, decisiveness, and community concern become crucial determinants (Muzakkir, 2022). Voters tend to use candidates' characteristics as the primary clues in making voting decisions, especially in conditions where the political ideology of the political party is unclear, and the differences in missions between candidates for the Central-Provincial House of Representatives are challenging to distinguish.

Amid political parties' lack of clear issue ownership, candidates become the main focus of voter evaluation. Candidates who can demonstrate alignment with other political party platforms or can flexibly use various political party platforms for their political advantage often succeed in gaining voter support. For example, Lonta illustrates how most candidates from the PAN Party tend to distance themselves from the 'Muhammadiyah' identity, indicating a shift from political party identity to individual candidate attributes in political campaigning.⁷

This strategy blurs the identity of political parties in the eyes of voters, making the boundaries of Party ID increasingly unclear. Candidates view political party

⁷Interview Results with the Member of the South Sulawesi Provincial House of Representatives from the PAN Party. Usman Lonta, on 3 Oktober 2021.

platforms as tools that can be modified and adapted as needed, reflecting a political communication strategy more oriented towards flexibility and persuasion. In this system, candidates who do not explicitly affirm their political party platforms or choose to move with similar strategies across political parties contribute to House of Representatives election dynamics that are greatly determined by the strength of partisanship and candidates' adaptive strategies.

Thus, strategic/policy balancing is crucial in influencing the split-ticket voting phenomenon in the Central–Provincial House of Representatives election 2019 in Makassar City. Valence politics theory underscores the importance of non-positional attributes such as honesty, intelligence, and overall performance in voter choice, which is highly relevant for understanding this phenomenon (Bruno & Downes, 2023). In a context where Party ID is unclear and strategic/policy balancing becomes dominant, voters tend to engage in ticket-splitting as a response to their assessment of the individual quality of candidates rather than their loyalty to a political party. Voters focus on personal characteristics and the individual capacity of candidates, which indicates that voting patterns are more influenced by internal voter factors and the direct influence of candidates rather than by the platform or ideology of a political party.

D. Campaign and Socialization Factors

In examining the split-ticket voting phenomenon, it is essential to understand that internal voter factors such as campaigns and socialization have their dynamics distinct from external influences. From the voters' perspective, campaign factors include various elements, where the primary motive for attending campaigns is to gather information about the likelihood of a candidate's or political party's victory (Silvester et al., 2021). Voters' lack of attention to campaign material indicates emotional or cognitive distance from the content presented. Additionally, voter attendance at campaign events is often coordinated by a political node, which acts as a link between voters and candidates.

Political nodes are crucial in organizing and directing voter support through political gossip and effective coordination strategies. This coordination ensures that voters clearly understand the candidates likely to win. Voter trust in political nodes becomes essential, especially when voters disregard the political promises made directly by candidates. It shows that campaign dynamics are more determined by social relations and informal information than by the quality or content of the official campaign presented (Nagao & Kennedy, 2021).

For example, Amri highlights the low potential for victory of Nurkanita Maruddani, where the frequency of face-to-face interactions between her campaign team and political nodes decreases as election day approaches.⁸ These interactions,

⁸Interview Results with a Political Node in Makassar City. Syaiful Amri, on September 18, 2021.

which should be golden opportunities for campaigning and socialization, are no longer effective. Meanwhile, candidates from other political parties in the same constituency are stepping up their campaign activities, creating a significant discrepancy in competitiveness.

Coordination between political nodes and voters becomes essential in explaining the internal dynamics that influence voter decisions. As entities closest to the voters, political nodes play a significant role in directing and convincing voters through circulating political gossip. They often adopt a candidate-centered approach, focusing more on individual candidates than on the platforms or identities of the political parties they represent (Plescica, 2017). This approach shifts the focus from the values and principles of political parties to more pragmatic strategies that prioritize the individual candidates' ability to utilize information and incentives to win elections.

On the other hand, the political reality in Makassar City reflects that political nodes want direct incentives as a severe barometer of a candidate's competitiveness. This phenomenon indicates a tendency for voters to support candidates who can offer direct benefits as the election approaches, which ironically reflects disappointment with leaders who prioritize personal interests over the public good. Although this statement may seem trivial, it reveals how crucial integrity and trust in politics are as factors influencing voter choice.

Interestingly, the level of competition among political nodes in Makassar City also reflects the intensity of the competition in influencing voter decisions. This process involves choosing between candidates from the same political party and between candidates from different political parties, often marked by information exchanges among voters to gauge the winning chances of candidates. Voters' final decisions in ticket-splitting are often paradoxical; although supporting one candidate, they might choose another less favoured candidate with more significant potential to be elected (Muzakkir et al., 2023). This phenomenon reflects the strategic complexity involving voters' evaluations of broader political conditions, not just personal preferences.

Thus, campaigns and socialization play a critical role in influencing the split-ticket voting phenomenon, primarily through the dynamic interactions between candidates, political nodes, and voters. Strategic coordination theory explains how political nodes strive to optimize voter choices through intense and strategic coordination (Cox, 1999), often through narratives shaped by political gossip and direct incentives. It shows that voters are influenced not just by the content of campaigns but by the delivery methods and strategies implemented by political nodes to secure votes. The erosion of effective face-to-face interactions and voters' tendency to support candidates based on short-term incentives reflect the limitations of conventional campaigning in contemporary political contexts.

This analysis underscores the importance of understanding internal voter factors that play a role in changing the dynamics of legislative elections, where campaigns and socialization not only persuade but also manipulate in the context of the split-ticket voting phenomenon in the Central–Provincial House of Representatives election of 2019 in Makassar City.

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

Based on the results and discussion, it can be concluded that voters demonstrate a rational or strategic approach to ticket-splitting in the Central–Provincial House of Representatives election of 2019 in Makassar City. Four significant internal factors influence this phenomenon: the strength of partisanship, incumbency information, strategic/policy balancing, and the effectiveness of campaigning and socialization. The strength of the partisanship factor indicates that voters tend to assess candidates for the Central–Provincial House of Representatives based on individual character and achievements rather than political party loyalty, highlighting a transition from political party support to personal evaluation. Furthermore, incumbency information reveals voters' pragmatic behavior based on rational choices to gain personal benefits. On the other hand, the strategic/policy balancing factor shows the significant influence of non-positional candidate characteristics in voter decisions, consistent with the principles of valence politics. Finally, campaigns and socialization play a crucial role through strategic coordination among candidates for the Central–Provincial House of Representatives, political nodes, and voters, emphasizing the importance of narratives constructed through direct interactions and political gossip in securing voter support. This analysis confirms that a deep understanding of internal voter factors is crucial to comprehending the split-ticket voting phenomenon in the Central–Provincial House of Representatives election 2019 in Makassar City.

Based on the above conclusions, it is recommended that candidates for the Central–Provincial House of Representatives from the same political party enhance collaboration and coordination to create straight-ticket voting for their voters. Meanwhile, it is essential for political nodes to strengthen coordination that prioritizes transparency and integrity in conveying information, thus enhancing voter trust. On the other hand, voters should be encouraged to actively seek information about candidates' track records and policies to make decisions based more on substantial judgment than the influence of political gossip or short-term incentives. The General Election Commission should ensure that information about candidates is widely available and easily accessible, thus supporting transparency and more informative voting patterns. These steps are expected to reduce the phenomenon of split-ticket voting in the simultaneous elections for the coming period in Makassar City.

REFERENCES

- Aylott, N., & Bolin, N. (2021). Conflicts and Coronations: Analysing Leader Selection in European Political Parties. In N. Aylott & N. Bolin (Eds.), *Managing Leader Selection in European Political Parties* (pp. 1-18). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55000-4_1
- Basri, H. (2021). Strategi Komunikasi Politik DPD Partai Golkar pada Pemilu Legislatif Aceh Tengah 2019. *Interaksi: Jurnal Ilmu Komunikasi*, 10(1), 22-32. <https://doi.org/10.14710/interaksi.10.1.22-32>
- Bruno, V. A., & Downes, J. F. (2023). The Radicalisation of the Italian Mainstream: Populist Radical Right Parties and Extreme Right-Wing Movements in Italy (2012–2022). In K. Kondor & M. Littler (Eds.), *the Routledge Handbook of Far-Right Extremism in Europe* (pp. 129-144). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003256892-13>
- Cantoni, E., Gazzè, L., & Schafer, J. (2021). Turnout in Concurrent Elections: Evidence from Two Quasi-Experiments in Italy. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 70, 1-16. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102035>
- Chou, W., Dancygier, R., Egami, N., & Jamal, A. A. (2021). Competing for Loyalists? How Party Positioning Affects Populist Radical Right Voting. *Comparative Political Studies*, 54(12), 2226-2260. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414021997166>
- Cox, G. W. (1999). Electoral Rules and Electoral Coordination. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2, 145-161. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.145>
- Cunow, S., Desposato, S., Janusz, A., & Sells, C. (2021). Less is more: The Paradox of Choice in Voting Behavior. *Electoral Studies*, 69, 1-11. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2020.102230>
- Darkwa, S. K. (2019). *A Coordination-Based Approach to Subnational Variations in Split-Ticket Voting: The Case of Ghana 1996-2016* [Dissertation, West Virginia University]. Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports. <https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/4065>
- Downs, A. (1957). *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. Harper & Row.
- Gaivoronsky, Y. (2023). Strategic Coordination in the 2021 Russian Legislative Election: Effects and Counterbalances. *Russian Politics*, 8(3), 283-304. <https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00803001>
- General Election Commission of Makassar Municipal. (2019, 21 December). *Legislative Election of 2019*. <https://kota-makassar.kpu.go.id/web/pileg-2019>
- Gorelkina, O., Grypari, I., & Hengel, E. (2023). The Theory of Straight Ticket Voting. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 60, 365-381. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01418-2>
- Gschwend, T., & Kolk, H. v. d. (2006). Split Ticket Voting in Mixed Member Proportional Systems: The Hypothetical Case of the Netherlands. *Acta Politica*, 41, 163-179. <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500150>

- Husen, L. O., Muzakkir, A. K., & Nasirah, N. (2022). The Dispute of the Simultaneous Village Head Election: A Case Study in North Luwu Regency. *Al-Ishlah: Jurnal Ilmiah Hukum*, 25(1), 63-81. <https://doi.org/10.56087/aijih.v25i1.362>
- Jati, W. R. (2022). Comparative Analysis of Clientelistic Democracy in India and Indonesia: Outcomes and Challenges. *Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review*, 7(1), 69-82. <https://doi.org/10.15294/ipsr.v7i1.38487>
- Jenke, L., & Huettel, S. A. (2020). Voter Preferences Reflect a Competition Between Policy and Identity. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 11, 1-10. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.566020>
- Kim, K.-H. (2023). Valence Characteristics and Split-Ticket Voting of Partisan Voters. *Korean Economic Review*, 39(2), 517-539. <https://doi.org/10.22841/kerdoi.2023.39.2.008>
- Marua, A., & Muzakkir, A. K. (2023). Fajar.co.id Political Reporting: A Study on Editorial Policy Related to the Makassar Mayoral Election. *SIGn Journal of Social Science*, 3(2), 75-87. <https://doi.org/10.37276/sjss.v3i2.324>
- Mazzoleni, O., & Heinisch, R. (2023). Party Change beyond the 'Classical Models?' The Role of Agency, Context, and Democracy. In N. Carter, *et al.* (Eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Political Parties* (pp. 9-19). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429263859-3>
- Moskowitz, D. J. (2021). Local News, Information, and the Nationalization of U.S. Elections. *American Political Science Review*, 115(1), 114-129. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000829>
- Muhtamar, S., & Bachmid, F. (2022). Constitutionality and Ideology in the Electoral System: Pancasila's Moral Interpretation on the Proportional Representation System. *SIGn Jurnal Hukum*, 3(2), 201-220. <https://doi.org/10.37276/sjh.v3i2.227>
- Muzakkir, A. K. (2022). *Split-Ticket Voting pada Pemilihan Umum Legislatif DPR RI – DPRD Provinsi Tahun 2019 di Kota Makassar = Split-Ticket Voting in Legislative General Election of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia – the Provincial House of Representatives of 2019 in Makassar City* [Magister Thesis, Universitas Hasanuddin]. Repository Universitas Hasanuddin. <http://repository.unhas.ac.id/id/eprint/13454>
- Muzakkir, A. K., Alhamid, M., & Kambo, G. A. (2021). Pembatalan Pembahasan Rancangan Undang-Undang tentang Penyelenggaraan Pemilihan Umum dan Keterkaitannya pada Pemilihan Umum Tahun 2024. *Pleno Jure*, 10(1), 54-67. <https://doi.org/10.37541/plenojure.v10i1.560>
- Muzakkir, A. K., Alhamid, M., & Kambo, G. A. (2023). Split-Ticket Voting in Strategic Coordination Approach to General Election of Provincial – City House of Representatives of 2019 in Rappocini Sub-District, Makassar City. In *Hasanuddin Conference on Social and Political Sciences (HICOSPOS) 2021* (pp. 8-14). Sciendo. <https://doi.org/10.2478/9788366675667-002>

- Nagao, H., & Kennedy, J. J. (2021). The Rite to Vote: Community Interactions and Grassroots Voter Participation in China. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 26, 613-630. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-021-09748-1>
- Neuman, W. L. (2003). *Metodologi Penelitian Sosial: Pendekatan Kualitatif dan Kuantitatif* (Trans. by E. T. Sofia). PT. Indeks.
- Okeke, G. S. M., & Nwali, U. (2020). Campaign Funding Laws and the Political Economy of Money Politics in Nigeria. *Review of African Political Economy*, 47(164), 238-255. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2019.1699043>
- Oshri, O., Harsgor, L., Itzkovitch-Malka, R., & Tuttnauer, O. (2023). Risk Aversion and the Gender Gap in the Vote for Populist Radical Right Parties. *American Journal of Political Science*, 67(3), 701-717. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12696>
- Persson, S. (2020). *Exploring Split Ticket Voting Motives* (Swedish National Election Studies Program Report Series 2020: 14). University of Gothenburg, Department of Political Science. <https://www.gu.se/sites/default/files/2021-08/2020%2014%20Persson.pdf>
- Plescia, C. (2017). On the Mismeasurement of Sincere and Strategic Voting in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. *Electoral Studies*, 48, 19-29. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2017.05.003>
- Qodari, M. (2016). *Split-Ticket Voting dan Faktor-Faktor yang Menjelaskannya pada Pemilu Legislatif dan Pemilu Presiden Indonesia Tahun 2014* [Dissertation, Universitas Gadjah Mada]. Repository Universitas Gadjah Mada. <https://etd.repository.ugm.ac.id/penelitian/detail/91723>
- Riera, P., & Cantú, F. (2022). Electoral Systems and Ideological Voting. *European Political Science Review*, 14(4), 463-481. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773922000248>
- Septiadi, M. A., Salsabilla, A., Bernadib, B., & Nugraha, L. (2021). The Imperative Power of Election Law on Money Politics. *Soshum: Jurnal Sosial dan Humaniora*, 11(2), 112-119. <https://dx.doi.org/10.31940/soshum.v11i2.2480>
- Setiyawan, W., & Mashdurohatun, A. (2021). The Reforming of Money Politics Cases in Election Law as Corruption Crime. *Law Development Journal*, 3(3), 621-629. <http://dx.doi.org/10.30659/ldj.3.3.621-629>
- Silvester, J., Wyatt, M., III, B. P. E., & Ferris, G. R. (2021). Candidate Effects on Election Outcomes: Political Skill, Campaign Efficacy, and Intentions in a British General Election. *Applied Psychology*, 70(4), 1628-1668. <https://doi.org/10.1111/apps.12292>
- Stumpf, P. B. (2020). Strategic Split-Ticket Voting in Mixed Electoral Systems: The Cases of Germany, Hungary, and Lithuania. *International Journal of Political Activism and Engagement (IJPAE)*, 7(2), 47-67. <https://doi.org/10.4018/IJPAE.20200401.oa>
- Whitney, F. L. (1960). *The Elements of Research*. Prentice-Hall, Inc.

- Wono, H. Y., Masrur, M., Purnomo, F., & Arviana, S. (2022). Pragmatisme Partai Nasional Demokrat dalam Sistem Pemilu Terbuka. *JcommSci (Journal of Media and Communication Science)*, 5(1), 41-53. <https://doi.org/10.29303/jcommsci.v5i1.155>
- Woods, L. T. (2022). *How Do People React When They Can't Vote How They Want? The Relationship between the Public and Democratic Institutions* [Dissertation, University of Michigan]. Deep Blue Repositories. <https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/174311>