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Article Title

Recalibration of Authority in Handling Corruption Crimes after Law Number 20 of 2025: A KPK-Centered Investigation and Prosecution Model

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ABSTRACT

The handling of corruption crimes following Law Number 20 of 2025 presents a problem of authority configuration because the Police, the Public Prosecution Service, and the KPK each retain legal bases of authority under positive law. This institutional plurality supports corruption eradication, but it may also create overlapping jurisdictions, uneven coordination, and risks of institutional conflicts of interest. This study aims to analyse the configuration of authority in the handling of corruption crimes under Law Number 20 of 2025, examine the risks of institutional conflicts of interest, and formulate a normative legal protection model based on recalibrating authority. This study applies normative-doctrinal legal research using statute, conceptual, and analytical-prescriptive approaches through the examination of primary and secondary legal materials. The findings show that, de lege lata, corruption crimes are still handled by a plurality of authorities, including the Police, the Public Prosecution Service, and the KPK. However, this plurality has not yet been supported by an operational design capable of determining the functional controller in a clear, objective, and accountable manner. This study formulates a de lege ferenda model of functional centralisation of the investigation and prosecution of corruption crimes within the KPK, while still allowing the involvement of Police personnel and Attorneys through an assignment mechanism within the Commission's structure. This model requires amendments to sectoral Laws, strengthening of the KPK's institutional capacity, coordination standards, ethical oversight, and institutional evaluation to reinforce legal certainty, independence, accountability, and the effectiveness of corruption eradication.

Keywords: *Conflict of Interest; Corruption Crimes; Criminal Procedure Law; Functional Centralisation; Recalibration of Authority.*

INTRODUCTION

The handling of corruption crimes in Indonesia rests on a complex configuration of authority involving the Police, the Public Prosecution Service, and the Corruption Eradication Commission (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi*/KPK). Each institution holds a valid legal mandate under positive law. Yet the institutional relationships through which those mandates are exercised have not always been defined by clear operational standards. Institutional plurality may broaden the channels of anti-corruption law enforcement. However, where such plurality is not supported by clear standards for institutional relations, it may lead to overlapping jurisdiction over the same cases, divergent interpretations, uneven coordination, and inter-agency disputes (Hutahaean & Indarti, 2020; BPHN, 2023; Yusuf et al., 2025).

This issue has gained renewed significance following the enactment of Law Number 20 of 2025. This Law reorganises criminal procedure law through an integrated criminal justice system and functional differentiation. Investigation, prosecution, trial proceedings, legal aid, and other functions within the criminal process are placed within a single interconnected procedural framework. The handling of corruption crimes must therefore be read together with Law Number 31 of 1999[1], Law Number

[1] Law Number 31 of 1999, as amended several times, lastly by Article 622 section (1) letter l and section (4) of Law Number 1 of 2023.

2 of 2002[2], Law Number 30 of 2002[3], and Law Number 16 of 2004[4]. This integrated reading is consistent with the view that anti-corruption regulation dispersed across multiple legal instruments requires harmonisation to prevent implementation uncertainty (BPHN, 2023; Al-Fatih et al., 2025).

In this context, the central issue is not merely the existence of several institutions, but the way in which the boundaries and relationships of authority among those institutions are legally structured. Article 3 section (2) of Law Number 20 of 2025 preserves the applicability of special provisions through statutory exceptions. This clause is significant because corruption crimes have long been treated as offences requiring special procedural mechanisms. Recognition of that special character, however, does not by itself resolve the problem of inter-institutional authority. The problem persists because investigation, prosecution, coordination, supervision, and the transfer of case handling have not been embedded in a sufficiently operational design. Harmonisation in this context should therefore not be understood only as regulatory alignment, but also as the institutional arrangement of authority so that law enforcement functions exercised by different institutions do not obstruct one another (Al-Fatih et al., 2025; Bachmid, 2025).

Several previous studies have examined the authority of law enforcement agencies in combating corruption. The Police have been viewed as having a role in investigating crimes, including corruption, by virtue of their law enforcement authority (Hutahaean & Indarti, 2020). The KPK has been examined in relation to its independence, investigator status, institutional restructuring, and internal oversight (Imran & Koswara, 2023; Tauda et al., 2023; Nasuha & Isharyanto, 2024; Price, 2024). Other studies have addressed overlapping jurisdiction between the Police and the KPK in investigative practice (Yusuf et al., 2025). The literature on anti-corruption regulatory harmonisation also shows that the multiplicity of legal instruments may impair the effectiveness of law enforcement unless it is supported by coherent and operational regulation (BPHN, 2023; Al-Fatih et al., 2025).

Nevertheless, previous studies have not adequately treated institutional conflict of interest as an independent analytical category in the handling of corruption crimes. Institutional conflict of interest differs from personal conflict of interest. Personal conflict concerns the private interests of an individual official. In contrast, institutional conflict concerns an institution's interest in preserving its attribution of authority, reputation, access to information, resources, and control over case handling (Bautista-Beauchesne, 2021; Pangaribuan, 2025). In corruption cases involving public officials, political actors, law enforcement officers, or cases attracting substantial public

[2]Law Number 2 of 2002, as amended by Article 75 of Law Number 6 of 2023.
[3]Law Number 30 of 2002, as amended several times, lastly by Law Number 19 of 2019.
[4]Law Number 16 of 2004, as amended by Law Number 11 of 2021.

attention, control over case handling carries legal and institutional consequences (Xu & Xu, 2024). An analysis of authority must therefore include the risk of institutional conflict of interest.

The limitation of previous research lies in the absence of an adequate integrated analysis of three elements: the configuration of authority following Law Number 20 of 2025, the risk of institutional conflict of interest, and the need for a normative legal protection model. Some studies have examined the fragmentation of authority (Pangaribuan, 2025; Yusuf et al., 2025), while others have addressed the independence of the KPK or regulatory harmonisation (Price, 2024; Al-Fatih et al., 2025). However, studies that develop an analytical framework for recalibrating authority to prevent institutional conflict in the handling of corruption cases remain limited. This study addresses that limitation through normative legal research that draws a clear analytical distinction between the law in force and possible directions for legal reform.

The novelty of this study is framed proportionately. This study does not claim that the current positive law has made the KPK the sole institution authorised to investigate and prosecute corruption crimes. It proceeds from the premise that the law in force still recognises a plurality of authorities. On that basis, this study examines whether such plurality is adequate to provide legal protection for certainty, independence, and accountability in the handling of corruption cases. The novelty of this study therefore lies in the formulation of a normative framework for systematically analysing, testing, and recalibrating inter-institutional authority, while maintaining a clear boundary between the analysis of positive law and proposals for legal reform.

Based on the foregoing, this study formulates three specific objectives. First, it analyses the configuration and relationship of authority in the handling of corruption crimes following Law Number 20 of 2025 within the institutional relations among the Police, the Public Prosecution Service, and the KPK. Second, it analyses the risk of institutional conflict of interest arising from the plurality of authority, changes in institutional design, and regulatory disharmony. Third, it formulates a normative legal protection model by recalibrating authority to strengthen legal certainty, independence, accountability, and effectiveness in the handling of corruption crimes. Through these objectives, this study is expected to contribute to the development of special criminal procedure law for corruption and to the harmonisation of institutional regulation in the eradication of corruption.

METHOD

This study applies normative-doctrinal legal research (Qamar & Rezah, 2020). This method is appropriate because the primary objects of analysis are legal norms, legal principles, the concept of authority, institutional relations, and the construction of legal protection in the handling of corruption crimes. The study assesses normative coherence, relationships of authority, the risk of institutional conflict of interest, and the possibility of formulating a normative model supported by accountability mechanisms. The approaches used in this study include the statutory, conceptual, and analytical-prescriptive approaches. The statute approach is used to examine the norms governing the authority of the Police, the Public Prosecution Service, and the KPK in the handling of corruption crimes. The conceptual approach is used to define and develop the concepts of recalibration of authority, institutional conflict of interest, control over case handling, institutional coordination, integrated oversight, and normative legal protection. The analytical-prescriptive approach is used to examine the relationship between *de lege lata* and *de lege ferenda* while maintaining a clear analytical distinction between them.

The primary legal materials in this study consist of Law Number 2 of 2002, Law Number 30 of 2002, Law Number 16 of 2004, and Law Number 20 of 2025. The secondary legal materials consist of journal articles, research findings, academic reports, and literature addressing the authority of law enforcement agencies, the independence of the KPK, inter-agency conflict, regulatory harmonisation, oversight of anti-corruption institutions, corruption prevention, institutional evaluation, and anti-corruption governance. Tertiary legal materials are used only to support the tracing of terminology and the systematisation of legal materials. The legal materials are collected through library research (Sampara & Husen, 2016). They are then selected based on their relevance to the three main issues examined in this study: the configuration of authority following Law Number 20 of 2025, institutional conflict of interest, and a normative legal protection model based on recalibrating authority. Secondary literature is not treated as a substitute for legal analysis, but is used to support, compare, and test the normative argument developed in this study.

The legal materials are analysed through legal interpretation, norm systematisation, regulatory synchronisation, and prescriptive construction (Irwansyah, 2020). Legal interpretation examines the relationship between the general norms outlined in Law Number 20 of 2025 and the special norms governing the eradication of corruption crimes. Systematisation of norms is used to map the authority for investigation, prosecution, coordination, supervision, the transfer of case handling, the use of coercive measures, and oversight. Regulatory synchronisation assesses the coherence of authority among the Police, the Public Prosecution Service, and the KPK, including the possibility that different institutions exercise authority over the same case. Prescriptive construction is used to formulate a normative model for mitigating institutional conflict of interest.

To ensure analytical accuracy, this study distinguishes two levels of analysis. The first is *de lege lata* analysis, which examines the positive law that continues to recognise the plurality of authority of the Police, the Public Prosecution Service, and the KPK in the handling of corruption crimes. The second is *de lege ferenda* analysis, which formulates directions for legal reform based on identified weaknesses, unintegrated relationships of authority, and risks of conflict under the law in force. This distinction is essential to ensure that proposals for legal reform are not treated as rules already in force, while preserving the integrity of normative legal argumentation.

The model formulated in this study is tested through legal argumentation based on four criteria. First, the model must conform to the structure of criminal procedure law and the special provisions on the eradication of corruption crimes. Second, it must be capable of mitigating risks arising from conflicts over attribution of authority, institutional reputation, access to information, resources, and control over case handling. Third, it must be feasible to maintain accountability through oversight, ethical standards, and institutional evaluation. Fourth, it must be consistent with the need for institutional capacity and inter-agency coordination. Based on these criteria, the model formulated in this study is not merely a conceptual proposal, but a measurable normative construction capable of scientific justification.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

A. Configuration and Overlap of Authority in the Handling of Corruption Crimes following Law Number 20 of 2025

Law Number 20 of 2025 provides an essential point of departure for reassessing the configuration of authority in the handling of corruption crimes. This analysis must begin from *de lege lata* in order to maintain a clear distinction between the normative regime in force and proposals for legal reform. Under current positive law, corruption crimes are still handled through relationships of authority among the Police, the Public Prosecution Service, and the KPK. These relationships should not be reduced to a mere distribution of institutional functions. Each institution has a valid legal basis for exercising authority, yet that authority operates within a criminal procedure structure comprising general, special, and exceptional norms. This structure provides the basis for assessing the adequacy of the existing configuration and the need for recalibration through structural reform.

Article 2 section (2) of Law Number 20 of 2025 affirms that criminal procedure is administered within an integrated criminal justice system based on the principle of functional differentiation. This principle places investigation, prosecution, trial proceedings, legal aid, and community guidance as distinct stages within a single criminal justice process. In corruption cases, functional differentiation cannot be understood as a closed separation among institutions.

The principle requires clarity in the relationships among procedural functions, as a single case may fall within the authority of the Police, the Public Prosecution Service, and the KPK. Accordingly, the integrated criminal justice system must be understood as one that requires boundaries of authority, standards for institutional relations, and mechanisms for case transfer that can be applied consistently.

Article 3 section (2) of Law Number 20 of 2025 further affirms that criminal procedure applies to all crimes, subject to exceptions provided by Law. This norm positions the Law as the general criminal procedure law while also providing a legal basis for special procedural regimes. In corruption crimes, such special regimes are found in Law Number 31 of 1999, Law Number 2 of 2002, Law Number 30 of 2002, Law Number 16 of 2004, and institutional regulations governing coordination and supervision. The plurality of anti-corruption legal instruments may strengthen the eradication of corruption by providing diverse normative support. Conversely, these instruments may create legal uncertainty when the authorities regulated by several instruments are not connected by a clear operational design (BPHN, 2023; Al-Fatih et al., 2025).

The configuration of investigative authority under Law Number 20 of 2025 reflects a strong but non-exclusive general framework. Article 6 section (1) of the Law provides that investigators consist of Police investigators, civil servant investigators, and designated investigators. Article 6 section (2) of the Law positions Police investigators as the principal investigators authorised to investigate all crimes. However, the Police's position as the principal investigating authority does not eliminate the existence of designated investigators. Article 7 section (3), section (4), and section (5) of the Law regulate Police coordination and oversight over civil servant investigators and designated investigators, while providing exceptions for the Public Prosecution Service, the KPK, and the Indonesian Navy. Based on this regulatory structure, Law Number 20 of 2025 defines the position of the Police in investigative coordination while recognising special authority conferred by Law.

The position of the KPK within this configuration cannot be understood merely as that of an ordinary law enforcement agency. Law Number 30 of 2002 confers authority on the KPK to conduct preliminary inquiries, investigations, prosecutions, and coordination, and to supervise and take over case handling under specified circumstances. This authority was designed because corruption crimes have a special character, particularly in cases involving public power, state finance, bureaucratic structures, and the possibility of interference with legal proceedings. Nasuha and Isharyanto (2024) show that changes in the KPK's institutional design affect its independence and investigative process. Imran and Koswara (2023) also show that the use of internal investigators, as well as investigators from the Police and the Public Prosecution Service, raises issues regarding the continuity of case handling, control over information, and institutional relations. The issue of KPK investigators is therefore not merely an administrative matter of human resources, but also concerns control over case handling.

The role of the Police must still be placed proportionately. Law Number 2 of 2002 provides the legal basis for maintaining public security, enforcing the law, providing protection, serving the public, and investigating crimes. Hutahaean and Indarti (2020) show that the Police have a role in eradicating corruption, although its implementation is affected by capacity, coordination, and the need for specialised expertise. Recalibration should therefore not be understood as a rejection of the Police's investigative capacity. The issue to be examined is the normative choice between retaining corruption investigative authority within the original institution or transferring it to the KPK through an assignment mechanism that prevents dual institutional loyalty. Under this construction, the expertise of Police personnel may still be utilised, while operational control over case handling would no longer remain within the Police institution.

The position of the Public Prosecution Service also requires precise analysis. Article 64 letter b and its Elucidation in Law Number 20 of 2025 recognise Public Prosecutors in institutions granted prosecutorial authority by Law, provided that the officials concerned hold the status of Attorney. In the KPK context, corruption cases are prosecuted by Attorneys assigned to the KPK under the authority of the Attorney General. This norm indicates that prosecution by the KPK remains recognised and is normatively linked to the national prosecution system. The most crucial normative issue lies in separating professional status as an attorney from operational control over cases. The position of Attorneys at the KPK as institutional representatives of the Public Prosecution Service in corruption cases may leave a risk of institutional conflict of interest. Accordingly, legal reform should be directed toward affirming that Attorneys handling corruption cases at the KPK retain their status as Attorneys, while performing their duties within the KPK's task structure, case administration, and functional accountability framework.

The relationships of authority become more apparent at the stages of preliminary inquiry, investigation, case transfer, termination of investigation, and the use of coercive measures. Article 19 section (4) of Law Number 20 of 2025 regulates the transfer of case files to the competent institution where an event constituting a crime falls outside the authority of the investigator handling it. Article 20 section (1) and section (2) of the Law regulate the coordination and oversight of inquiry officers by Police investigators, with exceptions for the Public Prosecution Service, the KPK, and the Indonesian Navy. Article 24 section (3) and section (5) of the Law demonstrate the relationship among termination of investigation, Police involvement, and exceptions for certain institutions. Article 93 section (3) and section (4), as well as Article 99 section (3) and section (4) of the Law, regulate limitations on arrest and detention by designated investigators, while again providing exceptions for the Public Prosecution Service, the KPK, and the Indonesian Navy. This series of norms shows that relationships of authority do not concern only the institution conducting the investigation, but also the institutions that transfer, terminate, supervise, and exercise coercive measures.

These relationships of authority do not arise from the absence of a legal basis, but from the coexistence of several valid legal bases of authority. Yusuf et al. (2025) show overlapping jurisdiction between Police investigators and the KPK, which raises issues of coordination, supervision, and the exercise of institutional attribution. Bachmid (2025) shows that the KPK's authority in connected corruption cases also requires synchronisation to avoid divergent interpretations of authority. These findings support the argument of this study that the central problem does not lie merely in institutional plurality, but in the inadequacy of mechanisms governing that plurality within a coordinated case-handling procedure.

Within an integrated criminal justice system, uncertainty at the initial stage affects the quality of subsequent stages. Preliminary inquiry and investigation shape the legal construction of the criminal event, the status of legal subjects, the evidentiary strategy, and the direction of prosecution. When the initial stages are contested, the quality of the indictment and trial proceedings may also be compromised. Behuku et al. (2025) emphasise the importance of institutional capacity and clear guidelines in handling complex corruption cases. The configuration of authority among the Police, the Public Prosecution Service, and the KPK must therefore be understood as part of a unified criminal justice process, not merely as a description of the distribution of investigative authority.

Based on the foregoing, this Sub-Section affirms two points. First, from a *de lege lata* perspective, positive law continues to recognise a plurality of authorities in the handling of corruption crimes. The Police retain a legal basis for general investigative authority, the Public Prosecution Service retains its position in prosecution and certain crimes, while the KPK retains special attribution in preliminary inquiry, investigation, prosecution, coordination, supervision, and the takeover of corruption case handling. Second, this plurality indicates the need for legal reform. The technique of statutory exception already recognised under Law Number 20 of 2025 may serve as a conceptual basis for formulating a clearer *de lege ferenda* model, namely the centralisation of operational control over the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases within the KPK through amendments to sectoral Laws.

Accordingly, this Sub-Section does not state that the KPK is currently the sole institution authorised to investigate and prosecute corruption crimes. Instead, it treats the plurality of authority as a legal fact that must be analysed with precision. That legal fact nevertheless reveals relationships of authority that may generate structural problems. These relationships require further analysis, as they involve a risk of institutional conflict of interest inherent in a design of authority that has not yet been fully harmonised.

B. Institutional Conflict of Interest and the Need for Harmonisation of Institutional Regulation

The configuration of authority discussed in the preceding Sub-Section demonstrates that plurality of authority remains part of the law in force. However, such plurality does not necessarily produce an effective distribution of functions. In corruption cases, the plurality of authorities may generate institutional competition because they often involve public officials, law enforcement officers, political networks, and institutional reputational interests. The analysis therefore cannot stop at determining whether a legal basis of authority exists. It must also examine whether the existing authority structure is capable of preventing institutional conflicts of interest.

Institutional conflict of interest differs from personal conflict of interest. Personal conflict concerns the private benefit of an official or the misuse of office for individual interests. Institutional conflict, by contrast, concerns an institution's interest in preserving attribution of authority, legitimacy, reputation, access to information, resources, and control over case handling. In corruption cases, this type of conflict arises because several institutions hold legal bases of authority, while mechanisms for promptly, objectively, and bindingly determining the functional controller of a case remain inadequate. Institutional conflict therefore does not always originate from an official's deliberate misuse of authority. It may also arise from a design of authority that allows competing interpretations and competing claims over control of case handling.

Conflict over attribution of authority constitutes the first form of institutional conflict of interest. The Police exercise investigative functions under Law Number 2 of 2002. The Public Prosecution Service exercises prosecutorial functions and certain powers in special crimes under Law Number 16 of 2004. The KPK holds special attribution under Law Number 30 of 2002. Article 13, Article 14 section (1) letter g, Article 16 section (1), and Article 18 of Law Number 2 of 2002 provide the legal basis for Police action in law enforcement. Article 30 section (1) letter a, letter d, and letter e, Article 30A, Article 30B letter d, and Article 33 of Law Number 16 of 2004 *juncto* Law Number 11 of 2021 provide the legal basis for the role of the Public Prosecution Service in prosecution, investigation of certain crimes, asset recovery, corruption prevention, and institutional cooperation. On the other hand, Article 6, Article 8, Article 10, Article 10A, Article 11, Article 12, Article 39, Article 40, Article 42, Article 43, Article 43A, Article 45, Article 45A, Article 50, and Article 51 of Law Number 30 of 2002 *juncto* Law Number 19 of 2019 provide the legal basis for the KPK's special authority. The problem does not lie in the existence of attribution itself, but in the absence of a design that places those attributions within a single corruption case-handling procedure free from competition over authority.

Conflict over institutional reputation is the second and more sensitive form. Corruption cases involving public officials, law enforcement officers, political actors, or substantial public attention may enhance the legitimacy of the institution handling them. Conversely, failure, delay, or the perception of partiality may reduce public trust. Pangaribuan (2025) shows that inter-agency conflict within Indonesia's criminal justice system cannot be explained merely as a procedural difference, but is also connected to contestation over institutional authority and to institutions' efforts to preserve authority and legitimacy. Bautista-Beauchesne (2021) identifies bureaucratic reputation as an element that affects the legitimacy and autonomy of anti-corruption institutions. Xu and Xu (2024) also show that public support for the independence of anti-corruption institutions is connected to trust in other state institutions. In this context, control over the handling of corruption cases is not merely a procedural issue, but also an issue of institutional legitimacy.

Conflict over access to information and control over case handling constitutes the third form and is the most decisive operationally. The stages of preliminary inquiry and investigation determine the legal construction of the criminal event, control over evidence, the status of legal subjects, and the direction of proof. The authority of the Police, the Public Prosecution Service, and the KPK at the initial stage of case handling raises the question of which institution controls information, determines the legal construction, and directs the continuation of the case. Article 19 section (4) of Law Number 20 of 2025 regulates the transfer of a case to the competent institution. However, this norm still requires operational parameters for corruption cases that, from the outset, may fall within the authority of more than one institution.

Institutional conflict is also affected by changes in the KPK's institutional design. Law Number 19 of 2019 altered the Commission's position and introduced the Supervisory Board. Bima and Ramadani (2020) argue that the position of the Supervisory Board has not been adequately defined within the KPK's institutional structure, with implications for the Board's institutional and functional independence. Syahuri et al. (2022) identify the Supervisory Board as a central issue in the relationship between oversight and the KPK's autonomy. Tauda et al. (2023) view the institutional redesign of the KPK as a shift from an independent institution toward an independent executive organ. Price (2024) also argues that post-2019 changes, including oversight mechanisms and the employment status of Commission personnel, may reduce institutional autonomy. Accordingly, the analysis of institutional conflict of interest should not be limited to the KPK's relations with the Police and the Public Prosecution Service, but should also examine the KPK's internal institutional resilience against external influence and disproportionate oversight.

Oversight of the KPK remains necessary, but oversight must not operate as an intervention in law enforcement. Manalu and Siahaan (2022) emphasise the need to limit oversight so that it does not encroach on acts undertaken for judicial purposes or *pro justitia*. Lutfi et al. (2023) show that, following Constitutional Court Decision Number 70/PUU-XVII/2019, the Supervisory Board's authority over legal measures must be reinterpreted in light of a more appropriate oversight model. Sahroni and Arumbinang (2024) criticise the mechanism for appointing members of the Supervisory Board, which remains heavily dependent on presidential appointment and may weaken the principle of checks and balances. Oversight should therefore be directed toward integrity, procedural compliance, ethics, and accountability, not toward technical control over investigative and prosecutorial strategy.

The risk of institutional conflict of interest is intensified by the dispersion of anti-corruption regulation across multiple legal instruments. Al-Fatih et al. (2025) argue that harmonising anti-corruption regulations is necessary because certain norms overlap, remain vague, and have not been fully integrated. Bachmid (2025) identifies a similar problem in the context of connected corruption cases, namely the relationship between the KPK's authority, criminal procedure law, and military justice law. BPHN (2023) also notes that normative and institutional issues remain challenges in reforming anti-corruption law. Pawe et al. (2025) characterise this problem as a rule-of-law paradox, namely the inconsistency between legal norms and political practice. Regulatory disharmony is therefore not merely a drafting issue, but a structural problem of authority.

Harmonisation of regulation must therefore be understood as the redesign of institutional arrangements, not merely as the alignment of statutory substance. At the *de lege lata* level, plurality of authority must still be recognised because the Police, the Public Prosecution Service, and the KPK continue to hold legal bases of authority under positive law. At the *de lege ferenda* level, such plurality requires evaluation because it may generate conflicts over attribution of authority, institutional reputational interests, information, resources, and control over cases. A stronger conception of harmonisation lies in clarifying the functional controller of corruption case handling, without eliminating the professional capacity of Police personnel and Attorneys.

From an institutional perspective, harmonisation must also maintain a balance among authority, independence, capacity, and accountability. Sakib (2020) shows that anti-corruption institutions may lose effectiveness when independence, capacity, institutional cooperation, and state institutional commitment are not developed in a balanced manner. A limited analogy from environmental law also demonstrates the importance of clear parameters for exceptional norms. Hastian et al. (2024) show that exceptions to norms may generate divergent interpretations when they are not accompanied by strict parameters. This analogy is used only in a limited sense to affirm that exception clauses under Law Number 2 of 2002 and Law Number 16 of 2004 must be accompanied by limits on case types, personnel status, lines of control, coordination mechanisms, prohibitions on intervention, and institutional accountability.

Based on the foregoing, institutional conflict of interest in the handling of corruption crimes arises from the plurality of authorities, competing claims of attribution, institutional reputational interests, control over information, changes in the KPK's design, and regulatory disharmony. This conflict cannot be resolved merely through calls for coordination. It requires harmonising institutional regulations that transform overlapping relationships of authority into clearer assignments, data provision, technical assistance, and institutional coordination. Therefore, the following Sub-Section formulates a normative legal protection model that positions the KPK as the functional controller of the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases *de lege ferenda*, subject to accountability, oversight, institutional capacity, and operational amendments to sectoral Laws.

C. Normative Legal Protection Model Based on Recalibration of Authority, Coordination Standards, and Integrated Oversight

The analysis in the two preceding Sub-Sections shows that the core issue does not lie in the absence of authority, but in a structure of authority that allows problematic relationships of authority and institutional conflict of interest. The normative legal protection model formulated in this study is therefore directed toward the functional centralisation of the investigation and prosecution of corruption crimes within the KPK. This model is not presented as a claim concerning the law currently in force, but rather as a *de lege ferenda* proposal requiring amendments to Law Number 2 of 2002, amendments to Law Number 16 of 2004, and strengthening Law Number 30 of 2002. Under this construction, the study maintains a clear distinction between the law in force and the law proposed for reform.

This model positions the KPK as the functional controller of the investigation and prosecution of corruption crimes, without eliminating the expertise of Police personnel and Attorneys. Investigative expertise from Police personnel and prosecutorial expertise from Attorneys may continue to be used through an assignment mechanism within the KPK. The reform proposed is not the abolition of professional status, but the transfer of operational control over case handling. Personnel from the Police and the Public Prosecution Service must work within the KPK's structure, comply with the KPK's ethical standards, follow the KPK's case administration system, and be accountable to the KPK's oversight mechanisms when handling corruption cases. Professional status is therefore retained, while operational accountability in case handling no longer remains within the institution of origin.

The normative basis of this model may be developed from the pattern of exceptions already recognised under Law Number 20 of 2025. Article 3 section (2) of the Law provides the legal basis for the application of special provisions through exceptions regulated by Law. Article 6 section (1) and section (2), Article 7 section (3), section (4), and section (5), Article 20 section (1) and section (2), Article 24 section (3) and section (5), Article 93 section (3) and section (4), as well as Article 99 section (3) and section (4) of the Law show that criminal procedure law recognises general authority, designated investigators, and exceptions for certain institutions. This pattern may serve as a conceptual basis for formulating clearer exceptions in Law Number 2 of 2002 and Law Number 16 of 2004. Accordingly, the centralisation of functional control within the KPK is not placed outside the criminal procedure system, but is designed through a legislative technique already known to the legal system.

Amendments to Law Number 2 of 2002 should include an exception clause regarding the investigative authority over corruption crimes. The normative substance may provide that the police investigative authority is excluded from investigating corruption crimes within the KPK. Such a clause would not reduce the Police function in law enforcement generally. It would only regulate corruption crimes as a special category of crime in which functional control over case handling rests with the KPK. To avoid a merely textual amendment, the exception clause must be followed by rules on the status of assigned personnel, operational lines of control, access to preliminary inquiry and investigation information, performance assessment, prohibition of intervention by the institution of origin, case transfer, and accountability during assignment.

Amendments to Law Number 16 of 2004 must be drafted with greater caution because they directly concern the single prosecution system. Article 64 letter b and its Elucidation in Law Number 20 of 2025 recognise Public Prosecutors in institutions granted prosecutorial authority by Law, provided that the officials concerned hold the status of Attorney. This model therefore does not create non-Attorney prosecutors. It affirms that corruption prosecutions are conducted by Attorneys assigned to the KPK. The professional status of Attorneys remains preserved, while operational control over cases, the prosecution administration system, evidentiary coordination, and functional accountability are placed within the KPK by virtue of a special Law. Through this design, the single prosecution system remains respected, while the risk of institutional conflict of interest between the Public Prosecution Service and the KPK is reduced by separating professional status from control over case handling.

The strengthening of Law Number 30 of 2002 is inseparable from the amendments to those sectoral Laws. As the national functional controller of the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, the KPK requires detailed regulation on case coverage, regional structure, personnel assignment, case transfer, case registration, the use of coercive measures, ethical oversight, and institutional evaluation. All reports and findings concerning alleged corruption crimes should be registered in the KPK's case administration system, and the KPK should strengthen its institutional capacity. This strengthening must include regional working units, additional assigned investigators and prosecutors, budgetary support, a case administration system, and oversight facilities capable of reaching corruption cases at the national level. Without capacity strengthening, this model may have a normative basis but remain ineffective in implementation.

This model must also regulate the relationship between the KPK and the special structures already existing within the Police and the Public Prosecution Service. The anti-corruption structure within the Police and the special crimes division within the Public Prosecution Service should not necessarily be understood as structures that must be administratively dissolved. Their functions may be recalibrated to serve as providers of personnel, technical expertise, data, and institutional cooperation to the KPK. In corruption cases, those structures would no longer exercise control over case handling. Their functions would shift into supporting functions carried out upon request, coordination, or assignment by the KPK. In this way, the capacity already developed within the Police and the Public Prosecution Service remains available, but no longer creates competition over control of corruption cases.

Coordination standards remain necessary even when functional control over case handling is centralised within the KPK. Corruption cases often require

Police data, information from the Public Prosecution Service, government administrative documents, financial data, and cooperation with other oversight institutions. Coordination standards should include initial notification duties, report registration, response time limits, submission of initial documents, securing of evidence, limited case discussion forums, and recording of all coordination measures. The principal legal materials indicate that coordination dependent on informal communication and institutional discretion is insufficient to ensure stable case governance. Coordination standards must therefore be written, reviewable, and accompanied by legal consequences if disregarded.

A declaration mechanism for institutional conflict of interest must become a specific element of this model. Such a declaration is not the same as a declaration of personal conflict of interest. An institutional declaration is intended to identify risks relating to conflict over attribution, reputation, access to preliminary inquiry and investigation information, resources, and control over case handling from the earliest stage. The declaration should be mandatory in cases involving Police personnel, Attorneys, officials within law enforcement institutions, or cases previously handled by one of the institutions of origin. Recording these risks is not intended to accuse any institution of partiality. Its purpose is to provide an objective basis for placing the case immediately under KPK control and preventing it from becoming an object of institutional competition. This approach is consistent with the corruption prevention literature, which emphasises risk identification, institutional context, and concrete organisational controls (Ceschel et al., 2022).

The mechanism for resolving problematic relationships of authority must be formulated in operational terms. The receipt of a report, the discovery of an alleged corruption crime, or the performance of initial measures by the Police or the Public Prosecution Service must be followed by an obligation to secure information and submit it to the KPK. This procedure should include initial registration, notification to the KPK, securing of evidence, submission of preliminary files, and an official record of the transfer of control over case handling. Institutional objections must be submitted through a document-based forum for clarifying authority. Such a forum must not delay urgent legal measures. Accordingly, the resolution of problematic authority relationships would no longer depend on informal negotiation among officials, but would be governed by a measurable procedure.

Integrated oversight serves as the principal limiting mechanism to ensure that the centralisation of functional control within the KPK does not become an authority without control. Oversight should be divided into three levels. The first level is the KPK's internal oversight of investigators, prosecutors, and assigned personnel. The second level is ethical oversight by an oversight organ focused on integrity, compliance, and official conduct. The third level is external accountability through periodic reporting, procedural compliance audits, and institutional evaluation. Oversight must not control investigative strategy, the construction of charges, or the direction of proof. Bima and Ramadani (2020), Syahuri et al. (2022), Lutfi et al. (2023), and Sahroni and Arumbinang (2024) show that oversight of the KPK must preserve accountability without impairing independence. Integrated oversight must therefore supervise procedure and integrity, not direct the substance of cases.

The ethical dimension must form a core part of this model. Functional centralisation within the KPK can be justified only if supported by a functional ethical infrastructure. Arsyad et al. (2026) show that failures in ethical enforcement often occur because formalistic approaches are unable to change permissive bureaucratic habits. Accordingly, KPK personnel, assigned Police personnel, and assigned Attorneys must be subject to a single code of ethics for the handling of corruption cases. This code of ethics should include prohibitions on unofficial communication with the institution of origin regarding the substance of cases, on using case information for the institution's interests, on reporting pressure or intervention, and on preserving case independence. The code of ethics must not remain merely a document. It must be supported by ethical examination, clear sanctions, whistleblower protection, and publication of examination outcomes within limits that do not interfere with legal proceedings.

Information technology may be used as a supporting instrument, but it is not the core of the model. Adam and Fazekas (2021) show that information technology may support the anti-corruption agenda through transparency, reporting, data analysis, and oversight, but its impact depends on institutional context and user capacity. A corruption case information system should therefore be developed to support case registration, documentation of case transfer, tracking of coordination, recording of institutional conflict of interest, and monitoring of time limits. Access to the system must be restricted according to function, level of confidentiality, and procedural necessity. In this model, technology functions to reduce opportunities for procedural irregularities, not to replace legal assessment by investigators and prosecutors.

Institutional evaluation must be conducted periodically to assess the effect of centralising functional control within the KPK on certainty and effectiveness in case handling. David-Barrett et al. (2020) emphasise the importance of evaluating anti-corruption institutions through organisational capacity, coordination networks, and the tracking of policy change. Borlini (2024) shows that monitoring and compliance mechanisms may serve as instruments for evaluating the implementation of anti-corruption policy. Based on these views, the evaluation of the KPK must not be based solely on the number of cases handled. It must also cover procedural accuracy, quality of coordination, compliance with time limits, quality of indictments, effectiveness of ethical oversight, protection of independence, and the resolution of problematic relationships of authority. In this way, the model does not merely contain a change in authority, but also provides testable indicators of success.

Functional centralisation within the KPK must also be placed within broader institutional reform. Paranata (2025) shows that the success of anti-corruption policy depends on institutional reform, capacity building, public participation, and inter-agency coordination. Yustia and Arifin (2023) view bureaucratic reform as an important part of corruption prevention, as corruption arises not only from weak enforcement but also from weak governance. This model must therefore not be understood merely as a transfer of authority from the Police and the Public Prosecution Service to the KPK. It constitutes a reform of corruption case-handling governance, encompassing amendments to sectoral Laws, strengthening of the KPK's institutional capacity, personnel arrangement, coordination standards, ethical oversight, a supporting information system, and periodic evaluation.

Based on the foregoing, the normative legal protection model formulated in this study is accountability-bound functional centralisation within the KPK. Its main elements include amendments to Law Number 2 of 2002 and Law Number 16 of 2004 through exception clauses for the investigation and prosecution of corruption crimes within the KPK, strengthening of Law Number 30 of 2002, assignment of Police personnel and Attorneys within the KPK structure, written coordination standards, declarations of institutional conflict of interest, procedures for resolving problematic relationships of authority, integrated oversight, ethical infrastructure, a supporting information system, and periodic evaluation. This model is designed to accommodate two interests proportionately. First, corruption cases require a strong functional controller to prevent them from being impeded by institutional conflict. Second, such functional control must be constrained by accountability, procedural transparency, ethical oversight, institutional capacity, and testable indicators of success. Under this construction, recalibration of authority is not merely a general proposal, but a measurable model of legal reform aimed at strengthening legal certainty, independence, and effectiveness in the handling of corruption crimes.

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

The foregoing analysis shows that the handling of corruption crimes following Law Number 20 of 2025 remains characterised by a plural configuration of authority. The Police, the Public Prosecution Service, and the KPK continue to have legal authority under positive law, both through general norms of criminal procedure law and through special provisions within the anti-corruption regime. This study therefore does not conclude that the KPK is currently the sole institution responsible for investigating and prosecuting corruption crimes. A more accurate conclusion is that the law in force continues to recognise plurality of authority, although such plurality has not yet been supported by an operational design capable of determining boundaries of authority, case transfer, coordination, supervision, and the exercise of authority in a clear, consistent, and accountable manner.

These relationships of authority arise at the stages of preliminary inquiry, investigation, case transfer, termination of investigation, the use of coercive measures, coordination, supervision, takeover of case handling, and prosecution. The main issue is not merely the existence of more than one institution, but the absence of a sufficiently objective mechanism for determining the functional controller of a case within the relationships of authority among the Police, the Public Prosecution Service, and the KPK. In corruption cases, this uncertainty may affect legal certainty, continuity of proof, independence in case handling, and the effectiveness of corruption eradication. The plurality of authority must therefore be analysed as a valid legal fact, while still requiring normative reform, as its implementation may generate competition over authority.

This study also concludes that unintegrated relationships of authority may give rise to institutional conflict of interest. Such conflict differs from personal conflict of interest because it does not always concern an official's private benefit, but rather an institution's interest in preserving its authority, reputation, access to information, resources, and control over case handling. In corruption cases involving public officials, political actors, law enforcement officers, or cases attracting substantial public attention, control over case handling carries significant institutional implications. The problem therefore cannot be resolved merely through calls for coordination. It requires restructuring authority relationships to reduce institutional competition from the earliest stage of case handling.

On that basis, this study formulates a normative legal protection model based on recalibrating authority as a *de lege ferenda* proposal. The model is directed toward the functional centralisation of investigation and prosecution of corruption crimes within the KPK, while still allowing the involvement of Police personnel and Attorneys through an assignment mechanism within the KPK structure. Under this construction, the professional status of law enforcement personnel remains recognised, while operational control over cases, access to information, case administration, ethical standards, and functional accountability rest with the KPK during the handling of corruption cases. This model is not intended to create a concentration of authority without control, but to establish a design of legal reform constrained by accountability, procedural transparency, ethical oversight, institutional capacity, and periodic evaluation.

As a policy implication, lawmakers should consider amending Laws Number 2 of 2002 and Number 16 of 2004 by inserting exception clauses expressly providing that the investigation and prosecution of corruption crimes are carried out within the KPK structure under special provisions. Such clauses should not be treated as mere textual amendments. They must be followed by rules on the status of assigned personnel, operational lines of control, prohibition of intervention by institutions of origin, case transfer mechanisms, access to information, functional accountability, and institutional transition periods. At the same time, Law Number 30 of 2002 must be strengthened to ensure that the KPK has adequate normative and institutional capacity to perform these functions nationally.

The strengthening of the KPK must include a robust but accountable institutional design. This includes strengthening regional structures, assigning investigators and prosecutors, ensuring budgetary support, developing a case administration system, establishing written coordination standards, requiring declarations of institutional conflicts of interest, creating mechanisms for resolving problematic relationships of authority, strengthening ethical oversight, and conducting periodic evaluations. Oversight of the KPK must be positioned as an accountability instrument, not as a means of intervening in the substance of *pro justitia* acts. Functional centralisation within the KPK can therefore be justified only when accompanied by clear, proportionate oversight mechanisms that do not weaken the independence of case handling.

Academically, further research should focus on drafting more technical normative formulations for exception clauses in Law Number 2 of 2002 and Law Number 16 of 2004, as well as on a draft framework to strengthen Law Number 30 of 2002. Future studies should also examine the most feasible institutional design to support such functional centralisation, including the need for regional working units, assignment mechanisms for Attorneys and Police personnel, an integrated ethical system, case transfer standards, and an institutional evaluation model. Such follow-up research is necessary to ensure that recalibration of authority does not remain a conceptual proposal, but is further developed into an operational, measurable, and accountable design of legal reform.

Accordingly, the reform direction proposed by this study is to regulate the eradication of corruption through an institutional design that is clearer, more accountable, and better able to minimise the risk of institutional conflict of interest. The existing plurality of authority must continue to be analysed with precision as the positive law in force, but that regulatory condition does not eliminate the need for more decisive legal reform. Recalibration of authority through functional centralisation within the KPK, accompanied by amendments to sectoral Laws, strengthening of institutional capacity, coordination standards, and integrated oversight, constitutes the normative prescription for strengthening legal certainty, independence, accountability, and effectiveness in the handling of corruption crimes.

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