


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Article Title

## Institutional Reconstruction of the House of Representatives: A Constitutional Critique and the Crisis of Popular Representation

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## ABSTRACT

*The DPR, as the manifestation of popular sovereignty, is currently facing intense scrutiny due to structural dysfunction in the execution of its three functions. This study aims to analyze the constitutional critique of legislative dysfunction, oversight paralysis, and the crisis of representation under political party hegemony, and to formulate a concept for institutional reconstruction through an amendment to the relevant Law. Employing doctrinal legal research with statutory, conceptual, and comparative approaches, this research dissects the disparity between the constitutional design of the 1945 Constitution and the implementation reality of Law Number 17 of 2014. The results indicate that the DPR for the 2019-2024 period experienced legislative hegemony characterized by hyperregulation and absolute dominance over the DPD within a soft bicameral system. Furthermore, the oversight function was paralyzed by procedural hurdles regarding the Right of Inquiry quorum and by political subordination to the executive. The fundamental root of the problem lies in the crisis of representation, where the constitutional mandate of people's representatives has been degenerated by party sovereignty through a unilateral recall mechanism. This study concludes that institutional reconstruction cannot be pursued through institutional dissolution, but must proceed through regulatory reform encompassing the application of a regulatory guillotine, reformulation of Right of Inquiry requirements, abolition of member impunity, and tightening of recall conditions. The main recommendation is to amend Law Number 17 of 2014 to restore the checks-and-balances mechanism and restore the dignity of the DPR as the mouthpiece of the people.*


*Keywords:* *Crisis of Representation; House of Representatives; Institutional Reconstruction; Legislative Dysfunction; Popular Sovereignty.*

## INTRODUCTION

The House of Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* or DPR) is constitutionally designed as the manifestation of popular sovereignty and holds a central position in Indonesia's constitutional structure. Under the 1945 Constitution, this institution is mandated to exercise legislative, budgetary, and oversight powers within the framework of popular representation to uphold the principles of the separation of powers and a balanced distribution of power (Arifin, 2023). Theoretically, the DPR serves as the primary counterweight to executive power in a presidential system. However, contemporary constitutional reality reveals a sharp disparity between normative expectations (*das sollen*) and empirical practice (*das sein*). The DPR currently faces intense scrutiny regarding its institutional integrity, in which its ideal role as a positive legislature is often reduced to a mere legitimizing instrument for the agendas of political party oligarchies and executive power (Muttaqin et al., 2026).

The first and most glaring dysfunction is evident in the legislative function. The performance of the DPR during the 2019-2024 period demonstrated an anomaly: the low quantitative productivity of the National Legislation Program was inversely proportional to the swift enactment of controversial Laws lacking public participation (Angkang et al., 2025). This phenomenon indicates that the DPR is trapped in a practice of hyperregulation—producing legal norms that are textually bloated but

implementationally weak—rather than applying a responsive, smart-regulation paradigm (Bachmid, 2025). This issue is exacerbated by Indonesia's soft bicameralism, in which the dominance of the DPR over the Regional Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Daerah* or DPD) paralyzes the double-check mechanism in law-making, resulting in legislative products that are centralistic and frequently unconstitutional (Wardani, 2023).

Beyond legislative disorientation, the DPR also experiences paralysis in parliamentary oversight. The functional relationship between the DPR and the President, which should be a critical partnership, has shifted into a subordinate relationship due to the dominance of an oversized government coalition in parliament (Kusuma et al., 2024). Constitutional oversight instruments, such as the Right of Inquiry and Interpellation Rights, have become sterile due to procedural hurdles and "political omission," despite being vital for governmental control (Haryani & Sumiyanto, 2023). Consequently, the checks and balances mechanism fails to operate effectively, allowing the executive to execute strategic policies without adequate parliamentary control. The demise of this oversight function forces judicial institutions like the Constitutional Court to bear an excessive burden in rectifying the course of governance, creating an imbalance in the distribution of power that potentially undermines the accountability of the rule of law (Rezah & Sapada, 2023).

The fundamental root of these institutional dysfunctions lies in an acute crisis of representation. Popular sovereignty, which serves as the basis of legitimacy for council members, has eroded due to the hegemony of political parties. The recall mechanism, under the absolute control of party leadership, has transformed the constitutional position of DPR members from "people's representatives" into "party functionaries" (Asriyani et al., 2024). This condition creates what is termed a degenerative system of popular sovereignty, where the constituent mandate is annulled by the decisions of party elites (Evendia & Firmansyah, 2025). Low competence in political recruitment further undermines the quality of this representation (Antonio et al., 2024). This stands in stark contrast to democratic developments at the local level, which have begun to adopt practices of deliberative and participatory decision-making, while the DPR at the central level has become increasingly elitist and alienated from public aspirations (Schäfer et al., 2025).

Although prior research has extensively reviewed DPR performance from a quantitative perspective or highlighted the partial authority imbalance of the DPD in the bicameral system (Fadhil et al., 2025), few studies have integrated a constitutional critique of the dysfunction of its three functions with an analysis of the crisis of representation as the root problem. Most studies stop at surface-level critiques, offering no comprehensive solutions for institutional reconstruction. This study aims to fill this academic void by offering a critical approach that connects the

technical failures of the DPR's functions to design flaws in its member recruitment and dismissal processes, and by proposing concrete solutions through an amendment to the relevant Law.

Departing from these constitutional problems, this research is not trapped in the discourse of dissolving the institution, but focuses on systemic improvement efforts. Specifically, this study formulates two objectives. First, to analyze the constitutional critique regarding the dysfunction of the DPR's three functions and its implications for the crisis of popular representation under the hegemony of political parties. Second, to formulate a concept for the institutional reconstruction of the DPR through an amendment to Law Number 17 of 2014[1] to restore the mechanism of checks and balances and popular sovereignty. This research is expected to provide a theoretical contribution to the development of constitutional law and offer practical recommendations for lawmakers in reorganizing the institutional structure of the DPR.

## METHOD

This study employs doctrinal legal research, focused on examining positive legal norms and legal principles governing state institutions (Qamar & Rezah, 2020). The selection of this research type is based on the primary object of study, which concerns the vagueness and conflict in norms governing the functions, authorities, and rights of the DPR, as enshrined in the Constitution and the organic laws that regulate it. This research is not intended to test legal effectiveness within a purely sociological realm, but rather to evaluate the coherence of the constitutional law system surrounding the existence of the DPR. The logic constructed is deductive, concluding from major premises in the form of statutory regulations to minor premises in the form of constitutional legal facts.

To comprehensively dissect constitutional issues, this study utilizes four main approaches simultaneously. First, the statute approach is used to examine the hierarchy and harmonization of Law Number 17 of 2014 against the 1945 Constitution. Second, the conceptual approach is applied to analyze constitutional law doctrines related to the distribution of power, parliamentary oversight, and popular sovereignty. Third, the case approach is used to examine relevant Constitutional Court decisions and precedents for the enactment of controversial Laws.[2] Fourth, the comparative approach is employed to a limited extent to compare legislative authority designs and democratic practices between Indonesia and other nations, or between local democratic practices, in order to identify ideal benchmarks for institutional reconstruction.

[1]Law Number 42 of 2014, as amended several times, lastly by Law Number 13 of 2019.

[2]For example: Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia Number 91/PUU-XVIII/2020 on the Review of Law Number 11 of 2020.

The legal materials used are sourced from primary, secondary, and tertiary sources (Sampara & Husen, 2016). Primary legal materials consist of core regulations, namely the 1945 Constitution and Law Number 17 of 2014 along with its amendments. Secondary legal materials include reputable books and scientific journals that provide theoretical explanations regarding legislative dysfunction and oversight. Meanwhile, tertiary legal materials include legal dictionaries and encyclopedias that provide semantic clarity. The collection of legal materials was conducted through library research using a norm inventory system to identify articles that weaken the checks-and-balances system.

The legal material analysis technique is conducted prescriptively and argumentatively (Irwansyah, 2020). The initial step in the analysis is to inventory the key provisions of Law Number 17 of 2014, particularly those related to legislation, oversight, and immunity rights. Subsequently, legal interpretation is conducted using systematic, teleological, and comparative methods to determine the intrinsic meaning of the function of people's representatives, as intended by the Constitution. The results of this interpretation are juxtaposed with the legal facts of the DPR's performance for the 2019-2024 period to identify juridical gaps. The entire analysis culminates in the formulation of new legal arguments as the basis for the institutional reconstruction of the DPR, which is articulated in the recommendation to amend the relevant Law.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### A. Legislative Hegemony: The Dominance of the House of Representatives and the Marginalization of Public Aspirations

The execution of the legislative function serves as the primary measure of the parliament's performance as a representative institution of the people. Normatively, the constitution and laws have provided a clear mandate to the DPR. Article 70 section (1) of Law Number 17 of 2014 explicitly states that the legislative function is exercised as a manifestation of the DPR holding the power to form Laws. However, a deep analysis of the constitutional structure reveals that this power is not autonomous. The construction of Article 71 letter a of Law Number 2 of 2018 juncto Article 20 section (2) of the 1945 Constitution requires that every bill be discussed with the President to obtain "mutual agreement". This phrase, "mutual agreement," becomes a constitutional weak point that effectively leaves the DPR unable to be independent without the executive's seal of approval.

This structural dependency explains the anomalous performance of the DPR during the 2019-2024 period. Dominated by an oversized government coalition, the DPR transformed from a critical partner into a political rubber stamp, highly compliant with the President's desires. Muttaqin et al. (2026)

highlight that this blind obedience led to the passage of various controversial Laws, which substantively benefited the executive agenda but were detrimental to public rights.[3] Empirical data reinforce this thesis: the quantitative achievement of the National Legislation Program was remarkably low, yet the DPR was highly productive and swift in enacting Laws that were government initiatives or of government interest (Angkang et al., 2025). This confirms a shift in the legislative function from a tool of social engineering for the people into an instrument of executive power legitimation.

Beyond independence issues, the DPR is also trapped in a flawed legislative paradigm, specifically the tendency toward hyper-regulation. Parliamentary performance orientation is fixated on chasing quantitative targets in the National Legislation Program, as if success is measured by stacks of statutory paper, without regard for the quality of content and implementation. Bachmid (2025) strongly criticizes this condition as a failure to apply smart regulation. The legal products generated are frequently reactive, overlapping, and create new legal uncertainties. Ironically, amidst this poor legislative quality, the DPR attempts to build a positive image through public relations programs such as internships at the "people's house" (Akbar et al., 2024). However, a positive image of a political institution cannot be built on the rubble of poor regulation and widespread public rejection.

The hegemony of the DPR becomes increasingly evident and destructive in its relationship with the DPD. Indonesia's representative system, which adheres to soft bicameralism, creates an extreme imbalance in authority between the two chambers of parliament. Based on Article 174 section (1) of Law Number 17 of 2014, the DPD's role in legislation is drastically reduced to merely providing written considerations. The DPR has only an administrative obligation to "receive and follow up" on these considerations, without any legal obligation to incorporate their substance into the enacted Law. Wardani (2023) terms this design an absolute dominance by the DPR that kills the internal parliamentary checks and balances, as the DPD possesses neither veto rights nor decision-making power.

The marginalization of the DPD is exacerbated by systematic procedural restrictions. The DPD's room for maneuver in proposing legislative initiatives is constrained by Article 166 section (1) of Law Number 17 of 2014, which limits bill proposals to specific issues related to regional autonomy. This limitation renders the DPD powerless in responding to other national issues. Utami (2024), in her comparative study with the United States Congress, highlights that in a strong bicameral system, both chambers should possess balanced bargaining positions. In Indonesia, the arrogance of the DPR is legalized by Article 170 section (5) of Law

[3]For example: Law Number 11 of 2020 and Law Number 6 of 2023 on Job Creation.

Number 17 of 2014, which stipulates that if the DPD does not submit its views, the discussion of the bill may proceed regardless. This provision implicitly confirms that the DPD is merely a supplementary organ in the national legislative structure.

Pragmatic political intervention also heavily shapes the determination of the legislative agenda, overriding academic considerations and the state's objective needs. The case of the cancellation of the Election Bill discussion, which had previously been included in the National Legislation Program, serves as naked empirical proof (Muzakkir et al., 2021). Strategic legislative decisions are determined by closed-door agreements among party elites in the DPR, not based on academic drafts or public aspirations. The legislative process becomes highly elitist and closed, distancing legal products from the will of the people.

This condition of elitism at the center stands in stark contrast to democratic developments at the local level. Schäfer et al. (2025) found that at the grassroots level, decision-making practices related to resource management proceed in a more deliberative, inclusive, and participatory manner. While local communities are capable of practicing substantial democracy, the DPR in Senayan becomes increasingly centralistic and exclusive. Ultimately, this legislative hegemony not only produces defective legal products but also injures the constitutional mandate of the DPR itself. Without structural reform to end this dominance, the DPR will continue to suffer from acute legislative dysfunction.

## B. The Demise of the Oversight Function: The House of Representatives in the Shadow of the Executive Coalition

The legislative hegemony dominating the parliament has direct implications for the paralysis of another vital function: oversight. In the constitutional design, Article 20A section (1) of the 1945 Constitution explicitly mandates oversight powers to the DPR to uphold the principle of checks and balances. Theoretically, this function is necessary to prevent executive absolutism in a presidential system. However, the performance portrait of the DPR for the 2019-2024 period reveals an anomaly in inter-institutional relations. Kusuma et al. (2024) identify a shift in relations from a pattern of equal critical partnership to a subordinate relationship. The dominance of the government-supporting party coalition, controlling the majority of parliamentary seats (an oversized coalition), has transformed the DPR from a "*watchdog*" into a policy "rubber stamp partner," blunting its control function in the face of Presidential power.

Normatively and juridically, the DPR actually possesses comprehensive and robust oversight instruments. Article 79 section (1) of Law Number 17 of 2014 equips the DPR with three primary arsenals: the Right of Interpellation, the Right

of Inquiry, and the Right to Express Opinions. Haryani and Sumiyanto (2023) argue that the Right of Inquiry is the most effective investigative instrument for uncovering government policy deviations with widespread national impact. The existence of this norm should be sufficient to force the government to be transparent and accountable. However, empirical evidence shows that during the 2019-2024 period, the use of these special rights was virtually nil, especially on controversial strategic issues. The absence of this right's usage was not due to a lack of governance problems, but rather the result of a deliberate "political omission" by the majority factions in the DPR.

The sterility of this oversight function is systematically structured through procedural hurdles within the Law itself. Article 199 section (3) of Law Number 17 of 2014 requires that a proposal for the Right of Inquiry only becomes a valid DPR right if it receives approval in a plenary meeting attended by more than half of the members and is approved by more than half of the members present. In a political configuration where approximately 79% of parliamentary seats are controlled by government-supporting parties, this quorum requirement becomes a lethal "political mathematical trap".[4] The constitutional right to oversee the course of governance is locked by majoritarian formalities. Consequently, parliamentary oversight stops at mere rhetoric in the mass media, without ever entering the realm of legally binding official investigation.

Structural weaknesses are also found in the oversight follow-up mechanism. Article 74 of Law Number 2 of 2018 authorizes the DPR to request the President to impose administrative sanctions on officials who ignore DPR recommendations. This provision contains a serious juridical paradox. Ramadani (2020) highlights that the effectiveness of oversight relies heavily on the independence of sanction execution. By handing the "sanction ball" back to the President—who is notably the officials' superior—the DPR loses its coercive power. This position is significantly weaker than that of independent regulatory agencies that possess autonomous sanctioning authority. As a result, DPR oversight recommendations often end up as ignored administrative documents (paper tigers), without real consequences for violating officials.

When the parliamentary oversight channel is clogged, the burden of correcting government policy shifts forcibly to the judicial realm, specifically the Constitutional Court. This phenomenon creates an imbalance in power distribution. Arifin (2023) explains that the Constitutional Court serves as the last bastion to safeguard legal sovereignty when the DPR fails to fulfill its functions.

[4]Party Composition and Seat Distribution in the DPR: Parties within the Ministry (Cabinet) account for 348 seats, consisting of Golkar (102), Gerindra (86), PKB (68), PAN (48), and Demokrat (44). Government-Supporting Parties account for 122 seats, consisting of NasDem (69) and PKS (53). PDI-P stands as the sole Balancing Party holding 110 seats.

However, this burden shift is unhealthy for democracy. Judicial oversight is post-factum (after a policy becomes Law), whereas DPR political oversight should be preventive and corrective while the policy is in progress. The failure of the DPR to perform early prevention forces the people to fight alone against the state in court.

Ultimately, the demise of this oversight function underscores a crisis of integrity and accountability within the DPR, which holds the popular mandate. Rezah and Sapada (2023) emphasize that without robust independence, state institutions cannot guarantee accountability for power. The bluntness of the DPR in overseeing the executive is not merely a technical regulatory issue, but a symptom of a deeper disease: the fear of council members towards party leadership affiliated with power. This reality serves as a logical bridge to understand that oversight dysfunction is merely the downstream implication, while the upstream problem lies in the grip of party oligarchy over the fate of the people's representatives.

## C. The Crisis of Representation: Party Sovereignty over Popular Sovereignty

The failure to execute legislative and oversight functions, as outlined in the previous sections, is not merely a technical issue but a fundamental crisis of representation. There exists an internal juridical conflict within the construction of council membership regulated by Law. On the one hand, Article 67 of Law Number 17 of 2014 states that the DPR consists of members of political parties that participate in the general election. This provision explicitly binds the existence of council members to the party institution, establishing the party as the upstream source of their political legitimacy.

On the other hand, the oath of office in Article 78 of Law Number 17 of 2014 and the obligations of members in Article 81 letter k of the Law demand a different loyalty. DPR members are required to fight for the aspirations of the people and provide moral and political accountability to the constituents in their electoral districts. This duality of loyalty between "Party Representatives" and "People's Representatives" creates a perpetual conflict of interest. In the reality of pragmatic politics, loyalty to the party almost always prevails, defeating moral obligations to the people. Council members are held hostage by the oligarchic structure of the party that determines the fate of their political careers.

This political party hegemony is juridically legitimized through the mechanism of Interim Replacement, internationally known as the right of recall. Article 239 section (2) letter d and letter g of Law Number 17 of 2014 grant absolute authority to political parties to propose the dismissal of their members from the DPR on the grounds of dismissal from party membership. Asriyani et al. (2024) strongly criticize this recall right as a disciplinary instrument that kills the

independence of people's representatives. DPR members live under the threat of dismissal at any time if they dare to be vocal, critical, or dissent from the policy lines of the party leadership.

The impact of this repressive recall mechanism is the occurrence of a degenerative system of popular sovereignty. Evendia and Firmansyah (2025) explain that the sovereignty granted by the people through the ballot box is systematically "hijacked" and transferred to a few party elites through the administrative mechanism of recall. The votes of thousands of constituents who elected a DPR member become meaningless because they can be annulled by a single dismissal decree from the party. Although Article 241 of Law Number 17 of 2014 provides dismissed members with a right to defend themselves in court, the process is often ineffective and time-consuming, leaving the deterrent effect of the recall threat intact in silencing critical reasoning in parliament.

This crisis of representation is exacerbated by problems at the upstream level, namely political recruitment. Antonio et al. (2024) highlight that political party reform in Indonesia is stagnating, particularly in terms of cadre competence and professionalism. The legislative candidate recruitment process is frequently based on nepotism, proximity to elites, or mere financial capital, rather than on statesmanship, capacity, and integrity. Consequently, the DPR is filled by individuals who lack adequate capacity to execute complex legislative and oversight functions.

The low quality of these people's representatives is clearly visible when they face high-level political pressure. In cases of discussing strategic Laws laden with interests, such as the Election Bill, party elite intervention becomes the sole determinant of policy direction (Muzakkir et al., 2021). DPR members who are incompetent and fearful of being recalled tend to remain silent and engage in bandwagoning, failing to function as critical aspiration filters. This stands in stark contrast to democratic practices at the local community level which are more authentic and deliberative (Schäfer et al., 2025), where citizen participation is still valued.

In conclusion, the current DPR is experiencing an existential crisis due to the severance of authentic representational ties. As long as Articles 239 and 241 of Law Number 17 of 2014 continue to grant political parties a blank check to conduct recalls without constitutionally measurable reasons, the DPR will never become a true representative institution of the people. The restoration of popular sovereignty can only occur if people's representatives possess the political immunity to say "no" to their parties in order to defend the interests of the constituents who elected them.

## D. Institutional Reconstruction of the House of Representatives: Towards a Responsive Parliament

Based on the comprehensive analysis of legislative dysfunction, oversight paralysis, and the crisis of representation above, this study proposes a concept for the institutional reconstruction of the DPR. The proposed solution does not advocate for the unconstitutional dissolution of the institution, which risks creating a power vacuum, but rather calls for regulatory reform through an amendment to Law Number 17 of 2014. The first solution focuses on improving the legislative function by adopting a regulatory guillotine approach. Bachmid (2025) suggests that the DPR must possess the political courage to slash overlapping and inefficient regulations. This must be accompanied by a paradigm shift in legislation, from merely pursuing quantitative targets in the National Legislation Program to creating smart regulations: laws that are concise, implementable, and responsive to societal needs. An amendment to the DPR Rules of Procedure is required to institutionalize meaningful participation as a validity requirement for the law-making procedure.

In the oversight aspect, reconstruction must be directed at restoring DPR independence from executive co-optation. Procedural barriers that kill the Right of Inquiry must be dismantled. The quorum requirement for approval of the Right of Inquiry under Article 199 of Law Number 17 of 2014 should be amended to better accommodate minority rights. The current regulation, which requires majority approval, renders the oversight function dormant when the parliament is dominated by a government coalition. Lowering the support threshold for exercising the Right of Inquiry will revive the checks-and-balances function, forcing the government to be more accountable in implementing strategic policies.

Beyond strengthening internal DPRs, the reconstruction of the bicameral system is also essential to prevent the absolute dominance of a single chamber. Fadhil et al. (2025) emphasize that a healthy representative system requires a more proportional division of authority between the DPR and DPD. The amendment to Law Number 17 of 2014 must provide a more tangible role for the DPD in legislation and oversight processes, particularly on issues related to regional interests. Strengthening the DPD is not intended to compete with the DPR, but to create an effective double-check mechanism that prevents the birth of centralistic laws detrimental to the regions.

The next crucial aspect is reformulating institutional relations between the DPR and law enforcement. Ramadani (2021) proposes a relationship pattern of mutual respect without hostage politics. Sharp scrutiny must be directed at Article 245 of Law Number 2 of 2018, which governs the immunity of DPR members from

legal proceedings. The provision requiring the written permission of the President and the consideration of the House Ethics Council (*Mahkamah Kehormatan Dewan* or MKD) before summoning DPR members suspected of committing criminal acts must be abolished.

The drafting of Articles 121A and 122 of Law Number 2 of 2018 positions the MKD as the guardian of internal ethics; however, its composition, which is filled by DPR members themselves, creates an inherent conflict of interest (a self-policing paradox). Making MKD consideration a condition for the criminal justice process is a form of impunity that violates the principle of equality before the law. Therefore, the immunity of council members must be returned to its original intent, in accordance with Article 224 of Law Number 2 of 2018, namely protection of freedom of speech and stance in carrying out constitutional duties, not protection from legal entanglement in corruption crimes.

Strengthening the oversight ecosystem also involves guaranteeing the independence of supporting state institutions. Ramadani (2020) warns of the importance of maintaining the autonomy of independent regulatory agencies from excessive political intervention by the DPR. The reconstruction of Article 74 of Law Number 2 of 2018 must strengthen the binding power of DPR oversight recommendations so that they do not merely become recommendations on paper. On the other hand, the amendment to the Law must also limit the DPR's authority to intervene in the independence of judicial institutions (such as the Constitutional Court) or auxiliary institutions (such as the Corruption Eradication Commission) for short-term political interests.

Finally, and most fundamentally, is the restructuring of the upstream political system to address the crisis of representation. Bachmid (2020) asserts that the design of the election system and parliamentary threshold must be managed to guarantee the existence of popular sovereignty, not merely party stability. The current open proportional system needs to be evaluated to strengthen the accountability ties between representatives and voters. In line with that, the recall mechanism in Article 239 of Law Number 17 of 2014 must be tightened with objective legal proof requirements, consistent with the principle of protecting the popular mandate from the degeneration of party sovereignty (Evendia & Firmansyah, 2025).

The entire structure of this institutional reconstruction must be umbrellaed by the moral interpretation of Pancasila. Muhtamar and Bachmid (2022) emphasize that the value of wisdom in deliberation must be the spirit of every regulation. The reconstruction of Law Number 17 of 2014 is not merely a technical engineering project, but an effort to restore noble political ethics to the parliament building. By

slashing party hegemony, restoring member independence, and balancing power relations, the DPR is expected to become an institution truly responsive to the will of the people.

## CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

Based on a comprehensive analysis of the institutional reconstruction of the DPR, this study concludes with two fundamental points: the constitutional critique and the crisis of representation. First, the DPR for the 2019-2024 period experienced structural dysfunction in the execution of its Three Functions, rooted in legislative hegemony and the demise of the oversight function. Legislative dysfunction is characterized by the phenomenon of hyper-regulation and the absolute dominance of the DPR over the DPD within a soft bicameralism system, exacerbated by blind obedience to the executive due to the construction of "mutual agreement" in Article 20 section (2) of the 1945 Constitution. Meanwhile, the oversight function suffered paralysis due to procedural hurdles regarding the quorum for the Right of Inquiry under Article 199 of Law Number 17 of 2014 and a non-autonomous sanction mechanism, thereby failing to uphold checks and balances. This condition is a direct implication of the crisis of representation, in which the constitutional mandate of people's representatives has been degraded by political party sovereignty through the recall mechanism regulated in Article 239 of Law Number 17 of 2014, rendering council members hostage to a dual loyalty conflict.

Second, the institutional reconstruction of the DPR cannot be achieved through the institution's dissolution; rather, it must be pursued through an amendment to Law Number 17 of 2014, grounded in the restoration of popular sovereignty and state ethics. The proposed reconstruction concept includes: (1) The application of a regulatory guillotine in legislative rules of procedure to shift orientation from quantity to the quality of smart regulations; (2) The reformulation of quorum requirements for the utilization of the Right of Inquiry to be more accommodative of minority rights in order to revive the oversight function; (3) The abolition of the requirement for the President's permission and consideration from the MKD in the criminal legal process of DPR members to eliminate impunity; and (4) The tightening of the recall mechanism with objective legal proof requirements to protect member independence from the arbitrariness of party oligarchy. All these efforts must be underpinned by the moral reactualization of Pancasila within the representative system to ensure that the DPR once again functions as the authentic mouthpiece of the people.

As a concrete follow-up to these conclusions, this study recommends strategic steps for stakeholders. To the Lawmakers (DPR and Government), it is urged to immediately include the amendment to Law Number 17 of 2014 in the Priority

National Legislation Program, focusing on crucial articles that weaken member independence and oversight, specifically Articles 199, 239, and 245 of the Law. This amendment must be conducted with meaningful public participation and the involvement of constitutional law academics to ensure objectivity. To Political Parties, it is recommended that they undertake internal reforms of the recruitment system and the democratization of party management, and that they cease political recall practices to maintain the dignity of representation. Finally, the Constitutional Court is expected to consistently safeguard the constitutionality of legal norms governing DPR authority through progressive rulings, to rectify legislative deviations, and uphold the principles of democratic rule of law.

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